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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The problem of understanding and executing Natural Language instructions or commands is of 
both theoretic and practical interest: theoretic, because it bears on cognitive theories of actions; 
practical, because almost since the beginning of Computer Science there has been a desire to  
communicate with the computer in Natural Language, and have it execute commands. 
Instructions are meant to affect behavior, namely, the actions the agent performs; many 
researchers, among others Winograd [1972], Chapman [1991], Cohen and Levesque [1990b], Vere 
and Bickmore [1990], Alterman et al. [1991], have been and are working on the problem of 
mapping Natural Language instructions onto an agent's behavior. Many complex facets of 
this problem have been addressed, for example identifying the intentions that the agent should 
adopt as a result of a certain instruction, or computing temporal constraints among different 
actions the agent has to  perform. However, an aspect that, strangely enough, no one has really 
addressed is computing the objects of the intentions the agent adopts, namely, the actions to be 
performed: in general, researchers have simply equated such objects with predicate-argument 
structures extracted from the parsed input string. This may perhaps be correct when dealing 
with simple positive imperatives, which constitute almost the whole of the instructions examined 
in the literature. However, naturally occurring instructions are complex, and action descriptions 
cannot just be extracted from them, but they need to be computed. As a case in point, consider: 
Ex. 1 a)  Place a plank between two ladders. 
b) Place a plank between two ladders to create a simple scafolcl. 
In both a) and b), the action to be executed is ('place a plank between two ladders". However, 
1.a would be correctly interpreted by placing the plank anywhere between the two ladders: this 
shows that in b) the agent must be inferring the proper position for the plank from the expressed 
goal "to create a simple scafold". Notice therefore that the goal an action is meant to  achieve 
constrains the interpretation and / or execution of the action itself. Furthermore, notice how 
flesible a human a.gent is, in that s/he can deal with action descriptions at different levels of 
specificity without ally difficulty: s/he is able to adapt her knowledge to  the input, and vice 
versa, to interpret the input instructions according to her knowledge. 
I hope the previous example gives the reader a flavor for the three main points that I want 
to  make in this proposal: 
1. The actions an agent has to  perform when s/he is given instructions have to be computed 
from the descriptions given in the instructions themselves, as opposed to  simply extracted 
from such descriptions. 
2. The goals that an agent is trying to  achieve guide this computation; many of these goals 
are explicitly stated in the instructions themselves. 
3. Action descriptions found in instructions can't be expected to  exactly match the knowledge 
that an agent has about actions and their characteristics. Therefore, to model an agent in- 
terpreting instructions we need a flexible action representation, inference mechanisms that 
can deal with actions descriptions at various levels of specificity, and that build a structure 
of the agent's intentions that will help interpret the subsequent instructions. Borrowing 
the term from [Lewis, 19791, I collectively call these inference processes accommodation. 
1.1 Thesis Statement 
More in detail, my claim is that 
most instructions don't exactly mirror the agent's knowledge, but are understood by accommodat- 
ing them in the context of the general plan the agent is considering; the agent's accommodation 
process is guided by the goal(s) that s/he is trying to achieve. The concept of goal itself is perva- 
sive in  NL instructions, and a NL system which interprets instructions must be able to recognize 
and/or hypothesize goals, keep track of them, and use them in computing the description of the 
action to be performed. 
To show that my claim is justified: 
1. I will illustrate my views on the agent's inference processes by means of the analysis 
of naturally occurring data - in particular, the two constructions of purpose clauses 
and negative imperatives. I will show what pragmatic functions they perform, and 
what kind of inferences an agent has t o  do to understand them. 
2. I will show how the agent's inferences are directed by the notion of goal. This is 
equally true when the agent interprets purpose clauses, that express goals explicitly; 
or negative imperatives, whose correct interpretation is often constrained by the goal 
in the context of which an action should not be performed. 
To show that my claim is valid, I will discuss the consequences of such views for a com- 
putational model of instructions. I will propose to  develop a model consisting of 
1. A speaker / hearer model of imperatives, based on the one presented in [Cohen and 
Levesque, 1990bl. 
2. A representation of actions, and of goals, that provides support to  perform the infer- 
ences I will discuss. I will propose that a hybrid system, B la KRYPTON [Brachman 
et al., 19S3aI should be used, whose primitives are those that Ray Jackendoff proposes 
in [I9901 for the semantic representation of verbs and actions. 
'All the examples I will discuss are naturally occurring ones, unless otherwise noted. 
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3. Inference mechanisms that contribute to building the structure of the intentions - 
the plan graph - that the agent develops while interpreting instructions; the repre- 
sentation of such plan graph will also be discussed. 
1.2 Outline of Proposal 
In ch. 2, I develop my views on the process of understanding instructions: after reviewing some of 
the approaches taken in the literature, I will define what I mean by accommodating instructions, 
and how accommodation relates to  plan recognition. At the end of that chapter, I will restate 
n ~ y  main claim, the way I will assess it, and the work I propose to  do. 
Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to  the analysis of the data, purpose clauses and negative im- 
peratives, that provide evidence for the view of instructions put forward in ch. 2. 
In ch. 3, I examine purpose clauses, showing how goals, that purpose clauses explicitly describe, 
constrain the interpretation of action descriptions; and I describe which relations between the 
two actions described respectively in the matrix and in the purpose clause are possible. 
In ch. 4, I analyze negative imperatives. I show that there exist two classes of negative impera- 
tives, that have different pragmatic functions. Negative imperatives provide further support to  
the claims that goals affect the interpretation of action descriptions, and that action descriptions 
need to  be computed. 
I conclude both chapters with some remarks on the consequences that the analysis of such data 
has for a computational model of instructions. 
In ch. 5, I will describe the steps I have already undertaken, and the work I propose to 
do to  define a computational model of instructions: I will present the speaker / hearer model, 
the action representation formalism, the inference processes that build the plan graph, and the 
plan graph itself. In this chapter I will also describe the application context in which my work 
is taking place, namely, the Animation from Natural Language project at the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Ch. 6 is devoted to  summary and conclusions. 
Chapter 2 
On instruction understanding 
The problem of understanding and executing Natural Language instructions can be looked at 
from many different points of view: my particular interest lies in the inferences that an agent 
performs upon being given instructions in Natural Language - NL for short. Actually, a more 
correct characterization of such inferences would be "those that an agent may perform upon being 
given NL instructions". I am using may because it is not clear how interpretation and execution 
of instructions can be totally teased apart: namely, when are these inferences performed, when 
the agent interprets the instruction, or only when he executes it? The point I want to  stress is 
that there are inferences that an agent can perform without being yet engaged in carrying out 
the instructions: these are the ones I would like to account for. I will elaborate on this point in 
sec. 2.1.2. 
Discussing inferences that the agent performs upon getting NL instructions clearly cannot be 
done independently from one's general approach to  instruction understanding. Therefore, in the 
following section, I will show what understanding instructions has been taken to  be by different 
researchers, then I will start developing my own theory of underst anding instructions, based on 
Lewis's notion of accommodation [Lewis, 19791. 
2.1 Accommodating instructions 
There are many different points of view from which the problem of interpreting and executing 
instructions may be examined: they depend on different factors, among them whether the main 
research goal is to  develop a cognitive theory of how humans interpret and execute instructions, 
or to implement a working program; and the type of scenario in which instructions have to be 
interpreted and executed. Clearly instructions are meant to affect behavior, namely, the actions 
the agent performs; in turn, the choice of actions to perform depends on the goals the agent 
adopts, and on the performance situation he finds himself in. Unfortunately, in the literature 
one finds some confusion about how instructions relate to an agent's goals and actions. In the 
following, I will try to  characterize existing approaches t o  instruction understanding on the basis 
of 
1. whether an instruction is taken to be a description of an action to be performed, or a 
pointer to one of the agent's internal routines: in the former case, the agent has to actively 
compute the object of the corresponding intention, in the latter, s/he has to execute the 
corresponding routine; 
2. how the instruction relates to the goals that the agent may already have, and vice versa, 
how such preexisting goals can affect the interpretation of the instruction itself; 
3. whether the instructor has total control over the agent's actions and / or goals; 
4. whether the communicative situation in which an instruction is issued and the performance 
situation in which it is executed coincide. 
Before describing the different approaches that have been taken so far, I would like to elaborate 
on the first two items mentioned above, whether an agent maps instructions onto goals to 
perform an action, and whether there is any relation between an instruction and the goals an 
agent may already have. 
First of all, one should be clear about what action and goal are taken to  mean. One could 
say that the goal is a state to  be achieved and the action the act whose performance results in 
such a state; or that the goal requires intentionality on the part of the agent, while the action 
doesn't. For example Cohen and Levesque in [1990b] define goals as chosen desires; an agent 
has a persistent goal if he has a goal that he currently believes t o  be false and that he will 
continue to choose. Given that instructions describe the world in terms of actions, much more 
than in terms of desirable states, I think a reasonable view to take, and in fact one that has been 
widely adopted, is that an agent maps an instruction onto a goal, the goal of performing the 
action described in  the instruction. However, this point of view is at best adequate for situations 
characterized by an obedient agent and by instructions limited to simple positive imperatives. 
Consider a command like don't eat the cookies. First of all, the agent niay adopt three different 
attitudes toward such a goal: 
No commitment. If such an instruction is given to  a passive agent, or to  an agent who is not 
interested in eating cookies at all, because e.g. he does not eat anything with sugar at 
any rate, the correct final state will be achieved even if the agent's chosen desires, to  use 
Cohen and Levesque's terminology, don't include not eating the cookies. 
Rejection. The agent can of course reject the proposed goal, and in fact do the opposite. 
Commitment. The a.gent does adopt the persistent goal of not eating the cookies. 
Let's suppose now the agent does adopt that goal, either because we deal with an obedient 
slave, as many computer systems are built to  be, or because, more realistically, the agent is 
cooperative - see [Cohen and Levesque, 1990bl for a characterization of a cooperative agent. 
Adopting the goal of not eating the cookies can result in (at least) three different kinds of 
behavior, none of which in fact can be described as performing the action described in  the 
'I will actually limit myself to  imperatives: one does find declarative statements in  instructions, especially in 
instruction manuals, bu t  I won't deal with them. declarative statements appear in t h e  introductory part  
of the manual,  where tools and materials are described, not in  the part  describing the actual steps of the task a t  
hand. 
instruction - in fact, one may wonder whether negative instructions describe actions to  be 
performed at all: 
N o  observable action. The agent doesn't do anything that changes the state of the world 
with respect to the cookies. 
Cons t ra in t s  o n  o t h e r  actions.  Such a persistent goal may result in constraints on other goals 
that the agent may adopt: for example, if the agent were told Go and get me a glass of 
water, he could answer I'd rather not, because I would have to go to the kitchen, the cookies 
are there, and the temptation would be too strong to resist. 
Rela ted  observable  action. The agent may think that he cannot yield to the temptation of 
eating the cookies, and therefore he may lock them away, and put the key in a place which 
is difficult to reach: in this case the agent does perform some actions that help him achieve 
the desired goal. 
The point I want to  make is that many researchers have concentrated their efforts on positive 
commands, which one can indeed consider as describing an action a t o  be performed: a cooper- 
ative agent will then adopt the goal I' = PERFORM (H, a ) ) .  However, as we will see, I' varies 
according to  the type of imperative an agent is presented with - a complex positive imperative 
including a purpose clause, or a negative one, or a warning. Even when I' is indeed performance 
of the described action, as in positive commands, the described action a cannot be taken from the 
instruction as it is and just "plugged in" t o  obtain something like GOAL(H, PERFORM (H,a)): 
a has to  be computed, in ways that I will discuss in this proposal. 
That I' is not simply PERFORM (H, a) and that, at any rate, a has to be computed are 
two of the main points I want to  address. Before talking about them, though, I will discuss five 
different approaches to  instruction understanding in light of the previous comments. 
"Simon says" approaches.  In the Simon says game, each command issued by the leader 
("Simon says put your hands on your ears") is meant to  lead directly and immediately 
to behavior on the part of the player. In this case, a command is mapped onto a goal 
to perform the action it describes, and no further reasoning on the part of the agent is 
necessary, because the described actions are basic, namely, physical actions 2 .  There are 
no other goals that the agent has, the instructor has total control over the goals that the 
agent adopts, and the communicative situation is the performance situation. 
In computer systems of this kind, a command corresponds to a stored program: once 
the command has been interpreted, the corresponding program is executed. An example 
of such systems is the by now venerable SHRLDU [Winograd, 19721. The "Simon says" 
approach should not be discarded as the "easy" approach to  instruction understanding, 
because the interpretation and execution processes may be quite complicated: for example 
in SHRLDU, actions other than those described in the input command may be performed 
if they are necessary to  achieve preconditions of the described ones. 
T h e  s i tua ted  approach.  Chapman in [I9911 proposes a model of instruction interpretation 
that is concerned with reacting to the situation at hand, and that heavily relies on per- 
ception. The instructor gives instructions or offers suggestions, while watching an agent 
2 ~ e e  [Goldman, 19701 and [Pollack, 19861 for a discussion of basic actions. 
engaged in an activity - in Chapman's thesis, the activity is playing a video-game. There 
is no distinction between the agent's actions and goals, and each action can be adopted as 
a goal and executed. However, the agent is not simply an obedient slave and can choose 
whether to execute a certain action. Choices are hard-wired in an arbitration network. 
Chapman's view of instructions is that they give advice, but also that they are not much 
more than perceptual stimuli. 
When Sonja [the agent playing the game] is given an instruction, i t  registers 
the entities the instruction refers to and uses the instruction to  choose between 
courses of action that themselves make sense in the current situation. An in- 
struction can fail to make sense if it refers to  entities that are not present in 
the situation in which it is given, or if the activity it recommends is implausi- 
ble in its own right. ... As part of taking an instruction you register aspects 
of the situation you weren't previously aware of, and project new possibilities. 
Based on these new registrations you engage in new activities. ... Instructions 
recommend courses of action; Sonja's arbitration network takes account of such 
recommendations. ... Because instructions can only influence arbitration when 
they make sense in terms of activities Sonja could engage in autonomously, their 
role in Sonja is one of management only. [Chapman, 1991, p.761. 
An instruction then identifies one action among the ones that belong to  the system reper- 
toire, and gives an additional reason why the agent should choose it. However, that action 
will not necessarily be adopted as a goal. The communicative situation and the perfor- 
mance situation coincide as in the "Simon Says" approach, modulo making sense of the 
situation, e.g. turn left does not mean turn left immediately, but turn left i n  the first place 
where you can do so. Chapman's approach seems more concerned with making (immedi- 
ate) decisions about behavior, than with deriving knowledge from instructions and then 
acting. 
Vere and Bickmore. Vere and Bickmore in [1990] describe the architecture of a complete 
integrated agent. Their agent, a little submarine named Homer, is able to  navigate in a 
harbor full of other objects, to go to places, to deliver objects from one place to another. 
The submarine can take part in dialogues that include questions, assertions and commands. 
A command is a special case of an INFORM event in  which the information transmitted 
is that the informer has a goal and wants the informee to achieve it for him. ... There 
is a demon in the refEective processes which reacts to general commands by extracting the 
goals, processing them, and sending them to  the temporal planner for plan synthesis. 
Vere and Bickmore7s view is the usual one, that a command is mapped into a goal to 
perform the described action - apart from negative commands, see below. Homer accepts 
simple commands from the instructor, who has total control over it, and adopts them as its 
own goals: then it  reasons about whether it can achieve them. One interesting point is that 
there can be time constraints attached to commands, either explicitly - Drop the package 
at the barge next Sat. at 9 p.m., or implicitly - If you see an  animal tomorrow, photograph 
it: therefore the utterance situation and the performance situation don't coincide. 
The system allows for replanning, which is used to  deal with new declarative informa- 
tion which changes the parameters under which a plan had been formulated, and with 
additional goals, that may have to be achieved before another goal for which planning 
had already taken place. Homer does accept negative commands, which are considered as 
global constraints on the activities it can perform. For example, if Homer is told Don't 
leave the island today, and later, the same day, Take a picture of the Codfish, it will say it 
cannot comply with the latter instruction, because to  do so it would be necessary to  leave 
the island. 
Although Homer's abilities are quite impressive, i t  is not clear whether replanning and the 
capacity of dealing with negative commands amount to something more than propagating 
temporal constraints. 
The cooperative agent. Cohen and Levesque in [1990b] adopt the view that the agent adopts 
a certain goal as the result of an imperative because he is cooperative. 
If an imperative is uttered in circumstances where a hearer does not suspect 
(at some level of alternating belief) that the speaker is insincere in his desire t o  
get an addressed person to believe that he has a certain goal, then the hearer 
will believe (at that level) that the speaker really has that goal. The goal in 
question here is that the addressed person should perform something that fulfills 
the condition expressed by the imperative sentence (p. 237). ... If addr [the 
addressee] does not mind doing the action and is helpfully disposed toward spkr 
[the speaker], then we can conclude that addr intends to  do the action relative 
to splcr's desire (p.238). 
As it is apparent from the quotes above, Cohen and Levesque equate perform something 
that fulfills the condition expressed by the imperative sentence with doing the action relative 
to spkr's desire, which is actually formalized as a, where a is the content of the imperative. 
In light of my observations above on negative imperatives, this is not sufficient. Even 
limiting oneself to positive imperatives one may have to compute the described action a. 
In a more recent paper [1991], Cohen and Levesque go into some details on how an agent 
comes to  intend to  do an action to achieve a goal, and they hint a t  an action representation 
language, built inductively out of primitive events, and complex expressions created by 
action-forming operators for sequential, repetitive, concurrent, disjunctive, and contextual 
actions: this seems to me evidence for the fact that they consider event descriptions to be 
primitive, namely, that they are not interested in the internal structure of such "primitive" 
events; besides, they still don't address at all the issue of computing which actions an 
instruction describes. 
Cohen and Levesque don't discuss whether the utterance situation and the performance 
situation coincide: I imagine they would pay attention to such distinction if they did 
examine the performance of the action that fulfills the condition expressed by the imperative 
sentence. 
In my opinion, the most relevant part of their contribution is the fact that they model the 
communicative act taking place between the speaker and the hearer: I will come back to 
this and related issues in ch. 5. 
Instructions as a way of solving impasses. A different view on instructions is advocated 
in [Alterman et al., 19911. The stress is on extending stored knowledge to  new but similar 
situations, as for example when knowledge about using a certain device - a home phone - 
is applied t o  the usage of a new, but similar device - a pay phone. 
An agent has a basic set of skills and plans to solve certain problems. Instructions are 
used as a resource only when the stored knowledge about plans cannot be adapted to 
the situation at  hand, namely, when the agent is blocked in mapping the goal to action: 
instructions come in to specify the appropriate action(s) that will satisfy the goal in that 
particular situation. The agent has to  integrate these actions in his knowledge and to  
understand how they relate to the goal he was trying to achieve: this is the only paper I 
know which assumes a rich relation between the instructions and the preexisting goal(s). 
It is crucial that the communicative situation and the performance situation are the same: 
communication comes in to  repair a breakdown in performance. From a certain point 
of view, Chapman's approach is not so different, in the sense that for Chapman as well 
instructions come in as an additional source of information about the course of action to 
follow, when the agent doesn't have enough information to  choose a course of action over 
the other. 
The following table summarizes the approaches outlined above: the column goal contains 
action refers to  whether an instruction is directly mapped into the goal of performing the de- 
scribed action; NA stands for Not Applicable: 
"Apart from negative commands. 
Approach 
I think one conclusion that can be drawn from this table is that in general researchers have 
not worried about computing the action a to be performed; and that, apart from [Alterman et 
al., 19911, not much attention is paid to the mutual interaction between the current instruction 
and preexisting goals. The approach I am going to  propose instead relies in an active way on 
such mutual interaction, and tries to make the agent's knowledge flexible enough so that the 
same instruction uttered in the context of different goals will result in different behavior. 
The scenario I have in mind is as follows: the speaker - to whom I will refer by means 
of "S", and feminine pronouns - gives instructions to  the hearer - "H", referred to by means 
of masculine pronouns. S formulates her instructions by taking into account what S thinks H 
knows and can do. Of course, S doesn't exactly know what H knows, and moreover, in certain 
applications, S issues commands related to S's, not H7s, knowledge of the current situation. 
However, S can rely on some basic skills and abilities that S knows H has, and on the fact that 
H is not a cognitively passive slave that can accept only instructions that exactly mirror his 
go a1 
contains action 
utterance sit. 
necessarily = 
performance sit. 
relation between 
instructions and 
other goals 
instructor 
in control 
knowledge, but can accommodate instructions with respect to his general knowledge, and his 
knowledge of the situation. 
That H can take, and in fact has to take, an active part in the interpretation and execution 
of instructions has been shown in work done in various areas, among which anthropology and 
plan recognition. 
As an example of observations made in an anthropological setting, consider [Suchman, 19871; 
she says that instructions are irremediably incomplete, and that the problem of the instruction- 
follower is viewed as one of turning essentially partial descriptions of objects and actions into 
concrete practical activities with predictable outcome. ... instructions rely upon the recipient's 
ability to do the implicit work of anchoring descriptions to concrete objects and actions. 
Some plan recognition work, in particular [Pollack, 19861, is also concerned with the fact that 
H has to be active in the execution of instructions. One of her examples is 
S: "I want to talk to Kathy. Do you know the phone number at the hospital? 3" 
H: "She's already been discharged. Her home number is xxxxxx" 
This dialogue fragment shows flexibility on H's part: he addresses S's goal of talking to Kathy, 
not so much her direct question, and answers cooperatively. 
The kind of flexibility that I want to account for is more limited, in a sense, than what 
Martha Pollack wants to account for: I'll discuss the differences with Pollack's approach in 
sect. 2.1.3. My view is that the hearer's task is one of understanding the role that an input 
instruction plays in a global plan to do something, but also to  adapt his own knowledge of that 
plan to the instruction he has to understand. I would contend that, in the vast majority of cases, 
instructions assume a certain basic set of skills and abilities of the agent and just specify how 
they are to be related to  one another. I think this is consistent with what Chapman says, that 
routine activity is by far the more common. W e  spend most of our lives engaged in  activities 
like making breakfast, driving to work, reading the paper, ...; these rarely involve novel elements. 
Even creative work is mainly routine: it's rewording sentences or painting the background of 
the scene .... While he was mainly concerned with how much you can do with just these basic 
skills, I am more concerned with how you can understand instructions by assuming these basic 
building blocks and relating them in the way the instructions suggest. 
To illustrate what I mean with relating basic blocks to each other, let's consider the following 
example 4:  
Ex. 2 Go into the other room to  get the urn of coffee. 
It is clear that H doesn't have a particular plan that deals with getting an  urn of cofSee. He 
will have a generic plan about get z, which he will adapt to the instructions S gives him 5 .  Some 
of this adaptation task is quite easy, namely, parameter instantiation, in this case binding the 
patient parameter of get t o  an individual satisfying the description urn of coffee. But the rest 
is not so direct: H has to find the connection between go into the other room and get the urn of 
3That S formulates his request as a question is not important: give me the phone number at the hospital would 
be equivalent, albeit less polite. 
4From the animation script used in the AnimNL project [Webber et al., 19911 - see ch. 5. 
5 ~ c t u a l l y  H may have more than one single plan for get x, in which case go into the other room may in fact 
help to select the plan the instructor has in mind - I will address this issue later. 
coflee. This connection requires reasoning about the effects of go with respect to  the plan get 
x; notice that the (most direct) connection between these two actions requires the assumption 
that the referent of the urn of coffee is in the other room. 
A possible strategy is as follows. The agent's plan for get will contain a requirement that 
the agent move to the place where the object to  be "gotten" is located: from this the agent 
can derive that the (most direct) connection between these two actions is that go into the other 
room fulfills this requirement, under the assumption that the referent of the urn  of coffee is in 
the other room. 
This process of adaptation of H's plan to S's instructions, I would claim, is what normally 
happens when people interpret instructions. I will call this process accommodation, borrowing 
the term from [Lewis, 19791, and using it in a related but slightly different way, as I will show 
in the next two sections. 
2.1.1 Lewis on accomn~odation 
Lewis in [I9791 uses the term accommodation to  refer to the process by which conversational 
score does tend to evolve i n  such a way as is required in  order to make whatever occurs count as 
correct play. By conversational score, Lewis means the state of the conversation, described by 
various components, such as sets of presuppositions. 
Lewis uses the concept of accommodation to deal with different linguistic phenomena, among 
which 
Presuppositions. If I say All of Frederick's children are asleep, and there has been no mention 
of Fred's children so far, the presupposition that Fred has children is readily added to  the 
set of current presuppositions. 
Definite descriptions. I will actually describe the way that Heim in [I9821 exploits accommo- 
dation to deal with novel definites, because her treatment is more perspicuous. 
In the file-change semantics Heim develops for NPs, the usage of a definite NP is felicitous 
only if there is already an appropriate card in the file describing the referent of that 
NP. However, there are some usages of definite NPs that do not fit with this condition, 
for example the inferrable usage ("the author" in "John read a book about Schubert, 
and wants to write to the author"). Heim rewrites her Novelty-Familiarity-Condition by 
postulating accommodation as an adjustment of the file that is triggered by a violation of 
a felicity condition and consists of adding to the file enough information to remedy the 
infelicity. 
She also adds that Under which conditions is accommodation an available option, and what 
exactly is added to the file when the option is taken? these questions are by no means easy 
to answer ... 
Planning. Lewis's accommodation is usually mentioned in regard to  referring expressions, but 
he also talks about planning, albeit briefly. He says (notice that the utterance that has 
to be accommodated is uttered while discussing a plan to  steal plutonium from a nuclear 
plant): 
Much as some things said in ordinary conversation require suitable presuppo- 
sitions, so some things that we say in the course of planning require, for their 
acceptability, that the plan contains some suitable provisions. If I say "Then 
you drive the getaway car up to the side gate", that is acceptable only if the 
plan includes provision for a getaway car. That might or might not have been 
part of the plan already. If not, it may become part of the plan just because it 
is required by what I said. 
As far as planning is concerned, therefore, Lewis's accommodation refers to  a global process, 
very similar to the one occurring for presuppositions, of making room for (relatively) new things 
in the plan if they are not already there. I am talking about a similar form of accommodation, 
that allows an agent to understand instructions that don't exactly mirror his knowledge. As I 
will show in the next section, I think the fundamental concept that comes to  play during the 
accommodation of a is the purpose to achieve which a has to  be performed. 
Before I proceed in the discussion, I need to draw some distinctions. 
1. So far, I have been talking about accommodating instructions: clearly, what is accom- 
modated is the content of an instruction. For example, if we map a positive command 
onto something like GOAL (H, PERFORM (a)),  then what needs to  be accommodated is 
actually the internal argument a. 
2. In the next section, I will start talking about the purpose of an action, and for lack of a 
better terminology, I'll use the term goal in that case too. The notion of goal will then 
correspond to a three-place predicate, stating that the agent has the goal of performing a 
in order t o  perform /?: 
For the moment, I'll use the term goal to  refer to  both definitions of the predicate GOAL: 
the reader should keep the distinction in mind. 
2.1.2 The i~otioil of g o a l  as guide to  accolnmodation 
Two questions that Lewis does not address are: why does H accept a certain instruction, and 
accommodate i t  in his plan to do something? Does accommodation happen because there is 
something else that supports and justifies it? 
My claim is that the answer to  the latter question is yes, and that the basic notion here 
is that of goal. In Lewis's example above, the accomnlodation necessary to account for the 
getaway car is readily performed because there is a global goal for the plan in question, which 
is steal plutonium from a nuclear plant; and a subgoal of this plan is escape safely. It's not 
blind accommodation, then: it happens because there is something that justifies it. Notice that 
mentioning the function of the car, getaway, is crucial to the accommodation process: if the 
instruction to  be accommodated had been Then you drive the car up to the side gate, it would 
have been much harder to find its place in the global plan, if no car had been mentioned so far. 
 his definition should not be taken too literally: I am just trying to keep the two different notions of goal 
distinct. I will come back to formalizing them in later chapters. 
In general, instructions cannot be interpreted without taking into account the context in 
which they are issued. This is of course true of other NL phenomena as well, such as referential 
expressions. However, in the case of instructions particular kinds of context have to  be taken 
into account, namely, the speaker's beliefs, as Martha Pollack has shown [Pollack, 19861; and 
the one I am most interested in, the goal in the context of which that particular instruction has 
to  be interpreted and executed. 
To prove my point, consider a simple instruction such as: 
Ex. 3 Open the door. 
The execution of this action will vary according to whether the goal of opening the door is letting 
the cat in or out - a small opening is sufficient; letting a guest in or out - the door has to  be 
open wider than for the cat; letting in or out movers that carry bulky furniture - the door is 
best propped open. 
In general, there is not a single goal according to which an instruction has to be interpreted 
and executed, but a set of them. Consider this instruction step in making a stuffed toy: 
Ex. 4 To attach arms, use doubled white carpet thread and push needle i n  one side of the body 
and out the other side at points indicated by dots on the pattern. 
The action push needle in  one side of the body ... has to be performed t o  attach arms. In 
turn, the action attach arms has to be performed in the context of making a doll: this puts some 
requirements on attaching arms, e.g. where the arms have to be attached. These requirements 
"filter down" to  the interpretation and execution of push needle in  one side of the body etc. 
Notice that the modifier at points indicated by dots in  the pattern is not sufficient to  establish 
where to  attach the arms. In fact, the pattern contains many dots, corresponding to  where arms, 
legs, head should be attached: therefore, the goal to attach arms does affect the interpretation 
of the prepositional phrases i n  one side of the body and out the other side. 
I would now like to  conclude this section by fending off some possible criticisms. 
1. The function of goals is only that of giving the agent the reason why he should 
perforin a certain action. This is a common view, but naturally occurring purpose 
clauses show that there is something else going on. I already discussed the following 
example in ch. 1: 
Ex. 5 a) Place a plank between two ladders. 
b) Place a plank between two ladders to create a simple scaflold. 
In both a) and b), the action to be executed is '$lace a plank between two ladders". 
However, Ex. 5.b would be correctly interpreted by placing the plank anywhere between 
the two ladders: this shows that in a) the agent must be inferring the proper position 
for the plank from the expressed goal "to create a simple scaffold". Therefore, to create a 
simple scaffold isn't simply used to tell H why he should place a plank between two ladders, 
but also to  help him execute the action correctly. 
2. Goals are significant only at execution time. Someone may object that, while the 
concept of goal is definitely relevant, it has to  be taken into account only at the moment 
of executing an action. This is the view embodied in [Alterman et al., 19911. While this 
is true for Ex. 3 above, there are two reasons why one would think that goals affect the 
interpretation of instructions too. First of all, i t  is very often NL itself that conveys, more 
or less implicitly, the goal in the context of which an instruction should be interpreted, as in 
Exs. 5.a and 6. Therefore a NL system that interprets actions has to be able to  recognize 
and actively use goals as they arise from NL specifications of actions, to compute the 
descriptions of the actions to  be executed. 
Secondly, an agent may perform inferences that make the actions he has t o  execute ex- 
ecutable without being already engaged in the corresponding activity. An example will 
make my claim clearer: 
Ex. 6 Cut the square i n  half to create two triangles. 
This example contains the explicit goal to create two triangles. The action described in 
the matrix sentence, cut the square in  half, is underspecified in that there are an infinite 
number of ways of cutting a square in half, including along an axis and along a diagonal. An 
agent with basic knowledge about the world, though, won't have any difficulty in executing 
this instruction in the correct way, namely, cutting the square along the diagonal, because 
the goal to create two triangles unambiguously specifies how the cutting action should be 
performed. What I want to  point out here is that I am not claiming that the computation 
of the action to  be executed necessarily happens at  interpretation time; what I do want to  
stress though is that, given his basic abilities, the agent can understand what is required 
simply from the NL instruction. These are the kind of inferences I'd like to  account for; 
and this is the sense in which I am saying that the goal affects not just execution, but also 
interpretation of instructions. 
2.1.3 Di f fe rences  w i t h  o t h e r  a p p r o a c h e s  
I would now like to  answer two very likely questions about my work: how is accommodation 
different from plan recognition 7? and how is it different from the approach to instructions 
advocated in [Alterman et al., 1991]? 
1. Is accoin i~ loda t ion  different froill plan recognition? 
Accommodation can be seen as a subtype of plan recognition, but only if plan recognition 
is defined is terms as general as those used by I<autz in [1990]: One is  given a fragmented, 
impoverished description of tlze actions performed by one or more agents, and expected 
to infer a rich, higlzly interrelated description. The new description fills out details of 
the setting, and relates the actions of the agents in  the scenario to their goals and future 
actions. The result of the plan recognition process can be used to  generate summaries 
of the situation, to help (or hinder) the agentls), and to  build up a context for use in 
disambiguating further observations. 
Accommodation, as plan recognition, can be considered as a process of inferring a rich, 
highly interrelated description, even if accommodation deals with descriptions of future 
'I am here talking about accommodation processes relative to understanding instructions, not about the 
accommodation in general, e.g. with respect to accommodating presuppositions. 
behavior, plan recognition with descriptions of observed events. However, the term plan 
recognition is generally used to refer to the set of inferences that various researchers working 
in the area have investigated. Accommodation is indeed different from those particular 
implementations of plan recognition: to  explain the difference, I will first illustrate the 
inferences I think are part of accommodation, and then the inferences investigated by two 
of the most important researchers in the area of plan recognition, Kautz and Pollack. 
Accommodation. The inferences that I have identified so far as being part of accommo- 
dation can be typified by Exs. 6 - Cut the square in half to create two triangles and 
2 - Go into the other room to get the urn of cojfee. 
In the first kind of accommodation - Ex. 6 - we have to find a more specific action 
r r l  which will achieve the goal specified by the purpose clause, as shown in Fig. 2.1. 
p (create two triangles) p (create two triangles) 
(cut the square in half 
along the diagonal) 
Figure 2.1: Schematic depiction of the first kind of accommodation 
In Ex. 6, we have ,O = create two triangles, rr = cut the square i n  half, a1 = cut the 
square in  half along the diagonal. 
In the second case, it is necessary to  find the conditions under which the current 
instruction makes sense: here, that the urn is in the other room, or at least, that the 
other room contains some indications as how to get the urn. These conditions can 
be worked out by relating the effects of go t o  what the performance of get requires. 
Lewis's getaway car example is similar, although more complex, as the getaway car 
has to  be related to  the content of the plan for stealing plutonium. Schematically, one 
could represent this kind of inference as in Fig. 2.2 - P is the goal, a the instruction to  
accommodate, Ak7s the actions belonging to the plan to achieve ,l3, C for the necessary 
assumptions. Ex. 2 would result in the configuration shown in Fig. 2.3. 
In this case the only object that needs to  be accommodated is a. However, it may 
happen that also the goal ,l3 needs to  be accommodated with respect to  the structure 
of the intentions that H has built so far. In general there may be structures of 
action descriptions that need to  be accommodated, such as those deriving from the 
interpretation of purpose clauses. However, I will try to  keep the process hierarchical, 
namely, first accommodate the goal ,l3, then the action a. After all, the goal ,l3 has 
more importance: the agent first has to  commit to it, and only after that he will 
commit to a way of achieving it .  
It may happen that the two kinds of inference need to  be combined, although no 
example I have found so far seems to  require it. In this case, we would need to find 
the conditions under which an instruction a makes sense in the context of a certain 
goal, and we may then discover that the relevant action is not a, but a more specific 
al, as in Fig. 2.4. 
In the latter case, i t  may also be necessary to check whether a1 remains compatible 
with the higher goal(s). 
Kautz. I<autz uses an is-a hierarchy and a part-of hierarchy to infer what plans a certain 
event can be part of; he then uses the goals he discovers to constrain the search for the 
plan of which the next event is part-of. Suppose he starts with an event description 
6;  he may then deduce that 6 can be part of the plans to achieve G1 or G2. A second 
event description w is in turn part of plans to achieve GI or G3. Finally, by merging 
the two subgraphs, Kautz obtains a description of what plans both E and w may be 
part of - see Fig. 2.5. 
The difference between accommodation and I<autz7s inferences is that accommodation 
doesn't assume an exact description of the action to  be performed, and in fact uses 
a known goal to compute the more refined actions needed to  satisfy the goal. I<autz 
goes the other way, as he exploits known and complete descriptions of events to infer 
higher and unknown goals. 
Pollack. Pollack in [I9861 is concerned with finding the relation between a known goal 
G and a known action a, relation that for her is embodied in an explanatory plan, 
or E-plan. She finds the proper E-plan relating G and a by searching in parallel for 
E-plans of which a is part, and for E-plans which achieve G. The important point is 
that certain conditions have to  hold for an E-plan to achieve G. If these conditions 
don't hold, then the algorithm will search for another E-plan, possibly independent 
from a ,  that can achieve G, and will suggest it to  the user - see Fig. 2.6. 
Therefore, both accommodation and Pollack's inference processes heavily rely on 
already knowing the goal. However, if a doesn't achieve the goal, my approach is 
to compute constraints on it, so that cr can be understood as a l ,  that does achieve 
G; instead, Pollack finds another E-plan that does achieve G, where a and the new 
E-plan are not necessarily related. 
Given that Pollack determines whether an E-plan does achieve G by means of con- 
ditions that have to  hold for the relation to  go through, she needs to know these 
conditions a priori to  be able to  evaluate them in the current situation. In recent 
work, Lochbaum [1991b] uses a similar representation, and makes it more flexible 
7 
accommodation 
A A ... A ... 
a 1 2 i 
a 
Figure 2.2: Schematic depiction of the second kind of accommodation 
Get the urn of coffee 
accommodation 
Go into the other room 
Get (H, urn-of-coffee) 
C = In(urn-of-coffee, other-room)) 
Go(H, into(other-room)) 
Figure 2.3: Example of the second kind of accommodation 
Figure 2.4: The two kinds of accommodation combined 
A 
by computing the possible variable bindings under which such conditions may hold, 
while Pollack has these conditions automatically grounded and simply verifies whether 
they hold; however, also Lochbaum needs to state all necessary conditions in advance. 
However, there are other conditions, like the assumption urn in the other room, that 
may be necessary in order for this relation to go through, and with which I am 
concerned, while they are not. 
? 
The distinctions between the inferences I want to account for and the ones accounted for 
by Kautz and Pollack are important, but in addition there is an underlying assumption 
that makes accommodation very different from the work done so far under the label plan 
recognition. The point of view that the actions described in the input have to  be considered 
as linguistic objects is at the basis of my efforts. I treat the contents of instructions as 
descriptions, and most likely, incomplete ones. I am interested in explaining how the real 
action descriptions that people use and understand can be accounted for. The need of 
treating actions as linguistic objects is not addressed at all in plan recognition work s. 
accommodation 
2. Is accoininodation different froin t h e  approach  in  [Alter inan et al., 1991]? 
The two may be seen as similar, because both advocate adapting H's plan to the in- 
structions. However, I take the view that instructions are continually integrated into 
the general plan that the agent is building, not only when the execution of an acquired 
procedure breaks down. 
'Others have looked at plan recognition in a linguistic setting (e.g. [Lambert and Carberry, 19911, [Litman 
and Allen, 1990]), but their linguistic considerations concern recognizing which speech-acts a certain utterance is 
an expression of, not what actions it describes. 
Figure 2.5: Kautz's inferences 
i f  C does not hold 
I 
a a 
Figure 2.6: Pollack's inferences 
To show that instructions are not only used in the way Alterman et al. suggest, consider 
following directions to reach a certain place in town. This is a typical case in which known 
actions, such as go straight until ..., turn left at ..., cross over ..., are related in a way that 
teaches the agent something new. However, this does not imply that all that the agent is 
doing is mapping reference points in the directions onto their referents in the environment 
and then executing the command. Directions, as all other instructional text, may involve 
complex imperatives, such as purpose clauses - to get into the building, turn left at the 
first intersection and ring the bell at the second door on your right; negative commands - 
turn left, but don't take the first left because it is a blind alley; warnings - Take the first 
left, but be careful if you're driving because it is very steep. 
One can't invoke a learned procedure for getting to a certain place if one doesn't know how 
to get there. Of course following directions may involve breakdowns of the kind [Alterman 
et al., 19911 describes. If the agent gets lost, he will do something to repair his plan, such 
as consulting a map or asking a passer-by for further directions. In the latter case, the 
agent will be given a new set of instructions, that he will have to integrate into the known 
plan, in a way presumably very similar to the process described in [Alterman et al., 19911. 
However, the general process of following directions seems to  me much more similar to  the 
one Chapman discusses, namely, putting together some basic building blocks in a novel 
way. 
A problem that [Alterman et al., 19911 accounts for, which I don't, is learning. Following 
directions to  get to  a certain place will teach the agent something new, namely, how to get 
there. One could say that in general it is following instructions, rather than interpreting 
them, that teaches the agent something new; this newly acquired knowledge may then be 
subsequently used as needed. For the moment, I won't address the issue of learning. 
2.2 Thesis statement and proposed work 
My claim is then that 
most instructions don't exactly mirror H7s knowledge, but are understood by accommodating them 
in  the context of the general plan H is considering; H7s accommodation process is guided by the 
goal(s) that H is trying to achieve. The concept of goal itseEf is pervasive in  NL instructions, and 
a NL system which interprets instructions must be able to recognize and/or hypothesize goals, 
keep track of them, and use them in computing the description of the action to be performed. 
To show that my claim is justified: 
1. I will illustrate my views on H's inference processes by means of two different syntactic 
constructions, purpose clauses and negative imperatives. I will show what pragmatic 
functions they perform, and which kinds of inferences H has to  do to understand 
them. 
2. I will show how H's inferences are directed by the notion of goal. This is equally true 
when H interprets purpose clauses, that express goals explicitly; or negative impera- 
tives, whose correct interpretation is often constrained by the goal in the context of 
which an action should not be performed. 
To show that my claim is valid: 
1. granted the importance of goals, I will show that, to perform accommodation, H uses 
(a) heuristics derived from the pragmatic usage of certain constructs in instructions; 
(b) knowledge about actions; 
(c) knowledge about relations between actions. 
2. I will then discuss the consequences of such views for a computational model of 
instructions. I will propose to develop a model composed of 
(a) A speaker / hearer model of complex imperatives based on the one developed in 
[Cohen and Levesque, 1990bl. 
(b) A representation of actions, and of goals, that provides support for performing 
the inferences I will discuss. I will propose that a hybrid system, Q la KRYPTON 
[Brachman et al., 1983al should be used. The primitives in the system should be 
the same that Ray Jackendoff proposes in [I9901 for the semantic representation 
of verbs and actions. Jackendoff's representation will then provide semantic 
theoretical foundations, while the hybrid system will provide an organization for 
the lexicon. 
(c) Inference mechanisms that contribute to building the structure of the intentions 
- the plan gmph - that H develops while interpreting S's instructions; the repre- 
sentation of such plan graph will also be discussed. 
And finally, a comment and a disclaimer 
In the statement of my claim above, I used the word mirror. It is obvious that  instructions 
don't exactly mirror H's knowledge: if they did, there would be no point in giving instructions in 
the first place! As I already pointed out,  the new information that  instructions provide mainly 
resides in the way that  actions known to  H are linked together to form a previously unknown 
plan to  achieve a certain goal. However, the way that  known actions are described in instructions 
cannot be expected to exactly correspond to  the knowledge that  H has of those actions: this is 
a point that  has often been overlooked in many systems that  deal with instructions, in which 
a representation such as cut.square.in-half.along-diagonal is supposed to capture all the infinite 
ways in which such an action could be described in an instruction. This is the inexact match 
between input instructions and H's knowledge I am referring to. 
As far as regards the disclaimer: the instructions I am dealing with are in Natural Language. 
Understanding them requires the numerous inference processes that Natural Language process- 
ing involves, such as pronominal reference, or telling apart distributive and collective readings 
of plural predicates, just to name two of them. Clearly I am not going t o  solve the general 
problem of understanding language: all I want t o  show is that ,  in dealing with instructions, 
first, the concept of goal is necessary; and second, that  there are specific inference processes 
that  help make sense of instructions, exploiting, among other things, heuristics derived from 
particular syntactic structures. I will assume that  I can abstract away from issues such as 
parsing, pronominal and definite reference, the treatment of plurals: such assumptions are even 
more reasonable because my work is grounded in the project Animation from Natural Language 
instructions [Badler et al., 1990; JVebber et al., 19911, where modules devoted t o  parsing and to  
representing and updating the discourse model do exist. I will discuss the project in sect. 5.5. 
Chapter 3 
Purpose clauses 
In the previous chapter, I emphasized the role that goals play in the accommodation process, 
where accommodation is a general name for many of the inferences that an agent performs upon 
being given NL instructions. I also claimed that such inferences are exemplified in a particularly 
clear way when the goal is explicitly expressed, as in the case of purpose clauses. 
In fact, it is purpose clauses that motivated my interest in the kind of inferences I am trying 
to  characterize. In this chapter, I will illustrate how accommodation processes come into play 
in the processing of purpose clauses. 
In the following, after a brief explanation of what I mean by the term purpose clauses, I will 
discuss: 
1. what entities the matrix clause and its adjoined purpose clause describe; 
2. what functions purpose clauses perform; 
3. what kinds of relations between actions purpose clauses embody. 
I will conclude with some brief remarks about the consequences of such analysis on a com- 
putational model of instructions, including a speaker / hearer model, action representation, and 
inference processes. I will go into the relative technical proposals in ch. 5. 
My observations are based on one hundred and one consecutive instances of naturally occur- 
ring purpose clauses, which I collected from a how-to-do book on installing wall coverings, and 
from two craft magazines 
3.1 Purpose clauses and action descriptions 
At a very general level, purpose clauses can be characterized as follows: 
1. S uses them to explain to  H the god P to  whose achievement the execution of a contributes. 
- - 
~ T O  be precise, 26 pages of the book provided 51 examples; all the remaining 50 examples come from the 
"project sections" of the magazines. 
2. They generally relate action descriptions at  different levels of abstraction, such as a physical 
action and an abstract process, as in Ex. 8 below, or two physical actions, but a t  different 
levels of granularity, as in 
Ex. 7 Bend your knees to lift a very heavy object. 
3. As I already observed in the previous chapter, not only does the goal ,B explain to  H why 
he should do a, it also constrains the interpretation of a - see Exs. 5 and 6. Therefore, 
from S's point of view, we can look at purpose clauses as constraints on the action to be 
executed; accordingly, H will have to compute the action to  execute. 
Before going into a more detailed analysis of purpose clauses, I'd like to make some brief 
remarks on my use of terminology. I am using the term purpose clauses to  refer to  clauses that 
express the agent's purpose in performing a certain action. I have concentrated on infinitival 
to constructions, but other clauses, such as those introduced by so that, such that may also 
perform the same function. Therefore, I am not using the term purpose clause in the technical 
way it has been used in syntax; there, it refers to a particular type of infinitival to  clauses, which 
are adjoined to  NPs. In contrast, the infinitival clauses I have concentrated on are adjoined to  
a matrix clause, and are termed rational clauses in syntax; in fact all the data I will discuss 
in this chapter belong to  a particular subclass of such clauses, subject-gap rational clauses. 
For a syntactic account of rational and purpose clauses and their differences, see [Jones, 19851, 
[Hegarty, 19901. 
In the following, I will discuss the following dimensions of analysis: 
1. what is described by the matrix and the purpose clauses - namely, actions or states; 
2. what kinds of goals are expressed by a purpose clause; 
3. what kinds of relations between actions are expressed by purpose clauses. 
3.2 Only action descriptions in purpose clauses? 
So far, I have been implying that both matrix and purpose clause describe an action, a and ,b' 
respectively: 
Ex. 8 To inix light colors, place white in  the dish first and add color slowly until desired 
color is reached. 
However, there are rare cases in which one of the two clauses describes a state a, while the 
other clause describes an action. I actually found only one such case, in which the matrix clause 
describes the state a :  
Ex. 9 To be successfully covered, a wood wall mus t  be flat a n d  smooth .  
I haven't found any instances in which both matrix and purpose clause describe a state. Intu- 
itively, this makes sense because what the speaker wants to express here is the purpose why a 
certain action should be performed; even in the syntactic literature this function is recognized, 
e.g. [Hegarty, 19901 says that rational clauses denote a rationale on the part of the agent to 
carry out the action described i n  the matriz clause 2 .  
3.3 Which kinds of goals? 
I have been saying that a purpose clause expresses a goal to which the action described in the 
main clause contributes. As I said, the goal ,8 gives a more abstract description of the action a 
that the main clause describes, or gives a more general context for the execution of a. In most 
cases, the goal ,8 describes a change in the world. However, in some cases 
1. The change is not in the world, but in H7s knowledge. By executing a, H can change the 
state of his knowledge with respect to a certain proposition or to  the value of a certain 
entity. 
Ex. 10 To de t e rmine  if a curve is t o o  small  for  t h e  blade, use this rule of thumb: 
the smallest circle you can accurately cut will have a radius twice the width of the blade 
you 're using. 
Ex. 11 You may want to hang a coordinating border around the room at the top of the 
walls. To de te rmine  t h e  amoun t  of border ,  measure the width ( in feet) of all walls 
to be covered and divide by three. Since borders are sold by the yard, this will give you the 
number of yards needed. 
Many of such examples involve verbs such as check, make sure etc. followed by a that- 
complement describing a state +. The usage of such verbs has the pragmatic effect that 
not only does H check whether q5 holds, but, if + doesn't hold, s/he will also do something 
so that d comes to  hold. 
Ex. 1 2  To attach the wires to the new switch, use the paper clip to move the springtype 
clip aside and slip the wire into place. Tug gently on  each wire t o  make  s u r e  it's secure. 
2. The purpose clause may inform H that the world should not change, namely, that a given 
event should be prevented from happening: 
Ex. 13 Tape raw edges of fabric t o  prevent  t h r eads  f rom raveling as you work. 
Ex. 14 To prevent  weeds f rom ge t t ing  a foothold i n  t h e  garden ,  mulch your 
seedlings when they are several inches high. Use a thick layer of straw, shredded bask, 
ground corn cobs, cocoa bean hulls, leaves, or newspaper. The mulch will smother weeds 
and increase soil moisture. 
From a discourse processing point of view, interpreting a purpose clause may affect the discourse 
model, in particular by introducing new referents. This happens when the effect of a is to create 
a new object, and p identifies it. Verbs frequently used in this context are create, make, form 
etc. 
2 ~ h e r e  are clearly other ways of describing that a state is the goal of a certain action, for example by means 
of so/such that, but  I won't deal with such data. 
Ex. 15 Join the short ends of the hat band to  form a circle. 
Similarly, in Ex. 6 the discourse referents for the triangles created by cutting the square in 
half, and in Ex. 11 the referent for amount of border are introduced. Ex. 11 shows that the 
function of introducing a new referent, and the previous functions I mentioned, are not mutually 
exclusive. 
3.4 Which relations between act ions? 
So far, I have talked about a contributing to achieve the goal P. The notion of contribution can 
be made more specific by examining naturally occurring purpose clauses. In the majority of 
cases, they express generation, and in the rest enablement. In the following, I will define both 
relations, I will provide examples of both, and finally I will talk about the fact that there is no 
clear cut distinction between the two. 
3.4.1 Generation 
Generation is a relation between actions that has been extensively studied in the literature, first 
in philosophy [Goldman, 19701 and then in planning [Allen, 19841, [Pollack, 19861, [Balkanski, 
19901, [Lochbaum, 1991al. 
Informally, if action a generates action P ,  we can say that P is executed by executing a. Ex- 
amples are (from [Goldman, 19701): 
The agent G turns on the light by flipping the switch, or 
G checkmates his opponent by moving his queen to king-knight-seven. 
Without going into too many details, we can say that an action a generates another action ,f3 
iff: 
1. a and ,8 are simultaneous; 
2. a is not part of doing ,O (as in the case of playing a C note as part of playing a C triad on 
a piano); 
3. when a occurs, a set of conditions C hold, such that the joint occurrence of a and C imply 
the occurrence of p. For example in the turning on the Eight example, C may include that 
the wire, the switch and the bulb are working. 
Although there is no generation relation between a and P if a is part of a sequence of actions 
A to do p, there maybe a generation relation between A and P, if the conditions above hold on 
A and p .  
Generation is a pervasive relation between action descriptions in naturally occurring data. 
There are cases in which it is expressed by the preposition by, as in: 
Ex. 16 Remove excess paste by wiping gently or blotting with a damp sponge. 
It can also be expressed with a simple free adjunct, as in: 
Ex. 17 A s  you work, clean the surface thoroughly each time you change grits, vacuuming off 
all the dust and wiping the wood with a rag dampened with turpentine or paint 
thinner. 
However, by clauses are not as common as purpose clauses: I found only 27 of them in the 
same corpus. Similarly, adjuncts are not often used to express generation: only 10 out of 97 
adjuncts found in a corpus that includes the one used for purpose clauses express generation 
[Webber and Di Eugenio, 19901. It looks like generation in instructional text is mainly expressed 
by means of purpose clauses. They may express either a direct generation relation between cr 
and p ,  or an indirect generation relation between a and ,O, where by indirect generation I mean 
that a belongs to a sequence of actions A which generates P.  
As an example of direct generation, consider Ex. 6, repeated here for convenience: 
Ex. 18 Cut the square i n  half to create two triangles 
In this case, the only action that needs to  be done to create two triangles is cutting the square 
i n  half [along the diagonal]. 
As an example of indirect generation, consider Ex. 8, or 
Ex. 19 To cut parts F measure 1-3/4" from the top and mark. Measure from that point 
7-1/2n to the left and mark. kfeasure up from the bottom 1-3/4" and mark. Draw a line from 
the first mark to the third mark to create the slant for the sides. Cut along this edge. 
The whole paragraph is an explanation of how to cut parts F. It is the whole sequence of 
actions described in the paragraph that achieves this result. Therefore, the relation between to 
cut parts F and measure 1-3/dn from the top and mark is one that I call of indirect generation: 
the latter action description is part of a sequence of actions that generates the former. Notice 
that the paragraph above contains another purpose clause, to create the slant for the sides, 
which individuates a subgoal in the context of cutting parts F. 
Following first Pollack [I9863 and then Ballcanski [1990], enablement can be defined as holding 
between two actions a and ,B if and only if an occurrence of a brings about a set of conditions 
that are necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) for the subsequent performance of P.  
An example is buying ingredients enables preparing the dish (from [Balkanski, 19901). In this 
case, buying ingredients brings about a condition that is necessary for the dish preparation 
action to be executable. 
There are not many purpose clauses that express an enablement relation between ar and P.  
In fact, there is only one example that truly seems to express enablement: 
Ex. 20 Unscrew tlze p~otective plate to expose the box. 
Unscrew the protective plate enables taking the plate ofS which generates exposing the box. 
Another case that at first sight could be classified as expressing enablement, but that actually 
doesn't exactly correspond to the notion of enablement is: 
Parts F refers to a diagram. 
Ex. 2 1  Build this simple but elegant corner shel f to  display all the other decorative pieces 
found in this issue. 
Having the shelf is not a necessary condition for displaying the decorative pieces. In fact, it's 
not even the case that H has to adopt the intention of displaying such pieces; probably such an 
example should be classified as facilitation - see [Balkanski, 19901. 
3.4.3 Generation and enablement in modeling actions 
That purpose clauses express generation and enablement is a welcome finding, given that these 
two relations have been proposed by several researchers - [Allen, 19841, [Pollack, 19861 - as 
necessary to  model actions. 
Pollack in her thesis [I9861 is particularly vocal in advocating these two relations as the basis 
for action representation. Her motivations stem from the need for a perspicuous representation 
for an agent's plans, representation that can support her view of plans as mental phenomenon. 
She notices that in the plan inference literature plans are generally derived by composing basic 
planning operators, which are represented as follows: 
Header: P 
Preconditions : P 
Body : a 
She criticizes such a representation because the relation between a and /3 is not precisely defined: 
researchers have assumed any of causes, is-a-precondition-of, is-a-way-to. She then prefers t o  
use a representation based on generation and enablement, which she can precisely define. 
I would like t o  add two further motivations for using generation and enablement. One is 
the presence of such relations in Natural Language instructions. The other is that using such 
relations to  model actions allows us to draw conclusions about action execution as well-a partic- 
ularly useful consequence given that my work is taking place in the framework of the Animation 
from Natural Language project [Badler et al., 1990; Levison, 1991; Webber et al., 19911 in which 
the input instructions do have to  be executed, namely, animated. 
Knowing that two actions are related by generation allows us to  draw the conclusion that, 
while two actions are described, only a ,  the generator, needs to be performed. For example, 
in Ex. 18, there is no creating action per se that has to  be executed: the physical action to 
be performed is cutting. As already pointed out in the previous chapter, the fact that only 
the generator a has to be executed does not mean that qualifications to  the description of the 
generatee ,i3 should be disregarded: in fact we know that the goal P constrains the interpretation 
and / or execution of a.  Consider Ex. 17: the instruction to the agent is that s/he has to vacuum 
and wipe every time s/he changes grits, which is a qualification to the description of cleaning. 
In contrast to  generation, if a enables P, the agent knows that, after executing a ,  P still 
needs to  be executed. In fact, if a enables P, a has to  temporally precede P, where temporal 
precedence should be understood as a beginning, but not necessarily ending, before P: in Ex. 22, 
hold has to  continue for the whole duration of the fill. 
Ex. 22 Hold the cup under the spigot to  fill it with cogee. 
In addition, in the same way that the generatee affects the execution of the generator, so the 
enabled action affects the execution of the enabling action. Consider, for instance, the difference 
in the interpretation of to in go to the mirror, depending upon whether the action to  be enabled 
is seeing oneselj or carrying the mirror somewhere else. 
Having established that these two relations are useful to model Natural Language descriptions 
of actions, the problem is to  formalize them adequately. 
One issue that has to  be addressed is the fact that the distinction between generation and 
enablement becomes blurred when we extend the concept of generation to  a sequence of actions 
A < a l , a z ,  ...,a, > that generate another action p *. What is then the relation between a; and 
p?  I will suggest that if < a l ,  a z ,  ...,a, > generates P, enablement may relate any pair a; and 
a k ,  while the relation between a; and /3 can be termed indirect generation. Actually, at least 
for i = 1, the relation between a; and /3 could be equivalently seen as enablement. 
I will go back to  the difference between generation and enablement in chapter 5. 
3.5 Consequences for a computational model of instructions 
I see three kinds of consequences that purpose clauses have on computational models of instruc- 
tions. 
First of all, they require that existing computational models of intentions, such as Cohen 
and Levesque's, be augmented to  take into account the particular interpretation process that 
an imperative containing a purpose clause requires of the hearer - in particular, that Do cu to 
do ,G' is used to  tell H that s/he should adopt the intention to  do /3; and that a contributes to  
the execution of p. It seems that the goal ,O has more importance than a :  namely, we should 
account for the fact that a (cooperative) hearer has to commit to  p, but could choose another 
a to achieve p. That the goal ,O has more importance than a is shown also when the purpose 
clause is adjoined to  a negative matrix clause, as in Don't use chemicals to clean your parquet 
floor. Needless to say, the hearer has to adopt the intention of doing P, cleaning the parquet 
floor, even if he must not adopt the intention of doing a, use chemicab. 
I will sketch a first formalization of these notions, based on [Cohen and Levesque, 1990b1, in 
chap. 5. 
Second, dealing with purpose clauses, and with naturally occurring action descriptions in 
general, raises interesting issues with respect to  the action formalism that we should employ. 
Some preliminary conclusions are that we should be able to  represent actions at different levels of 
specificity, and that generation and enablement should be included among the relations holding 
between actions. 
Third, the abundance of purpose clauses in naturally occurring instructions can help focus 
the accommodation process, both in suggesting the kind of inferences that need to be done, and 
in offering a way to  direct such inferences. 
In sect. 2.1.3 1 sketched two kinds of accommodation that directly derive from purpose clauses, 
namely, inferring the assumptions under which a certain instruction makes sense, and deriving a 
more specific description of the action to be executed, by applying to it the constraints deriving 
from the goal. 
4Goldman himself allows for sequences of actions t o  generate another action - see [Goldman, 19701. 
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The solution I have adopted so far to deal with the latter kind of inference is to  use hybrid 
knowledge representation systems [Brachman et al., 19901. However, such representation lacks 
a well-defined set of semantic primitives, necessary to provide a sound lexical decomposition 
for verbs. I found a source for such semantic primitives in Jackendoff's conceptual structures 
[Jackendoff, 19901. Part of my proposal will then be to integrate the two frameworks together. 
All these issues will be discussed in more detail in chap. 5. 
Chapter 4 
Negative irnperat ives 
In this chapter, I will consider the following two questions: 
1. Negative imperatives are not limited to  don't do a. Are different kinds of negative imper- 
atives used exactly in the same way, or does their distribution tell us something on the 
expectations that S has on the intentions H may adopt? 
2. What inference processes does H perform to understand negative imperatives? In partic- 
ular, what role - if any - does the concept of goal play? Consider: 
Ex. 23 Caring for the floor. A good paste wax - not a water-based wax - will give added 
protection to  the wood. B u g  about twice a year; wax about once a year. Excessive waxing 
can cause wax to build up, detracting from the floor appearance. 
Dust-mop or vacuum your parquet floor as you would carpeting. Do not scrub or wet- 
mop the parquet. Use a damp cloth to remove fresh food spills. 
H will understand the negative imperative by recognizing that dust-mop, vacuum, scrub, 
wet-mop, are all possible candidates for achieving the goal of cleaning the parquet; and 
that, although scrub and wet-mop may in general be performed to achieve a goal such as 
cleaning floor, they are not a viable alternative in this case. 
The question is then, what kind of relations the actions described in negative imperatives 
bear t o  one another and to a possible more general goal that has already been established 
- I am talking about already established goal because all the examples I found are inter- 
preted with respect to  the previous, and not the following, text. Making sure that this 
generalization really holds is part of future work. 
As we will see, the two questions are not independent, namely, different kinds of negative im- 
peratives in general perform different functions, and concern actions that bear different relations 
to one another. 
In the following, I will classify the data into two general classes, on the basis of the ex- 
pectations that S has on the intentions that H may or may not adopt; I will then discuss some 
consequences of the analysis of negative imperatives for a model of the inferences H has to make. 
4.1 The data 
There seem to be two basic classes of negative imperatives negative imperatives proper, 
characterized either by the negative auxiliary don't 2 ,  or by negative polarity items, such as 
never and nothing; the other class is formed by verbs such as take care, be sure and the like - 
T C  verbs for short - followed by a negative infinitival complement, such as ('not to ...", or ('to 
... negative polarity item ...". I will call the former class of imperatives the DONT type and 
the latter the neg- T C  type 3.  
The data is distributed as follows: 
1. 36 instances of the DONT type, and in particular 
(a) 32 with don't or do not: 
Ex. 2 4  Your sheet vinylfloor may be vinyl asbestos, which is no longer on the market. 
Don't sand it or tear it up because this will put dangerous asbestos fibers into the 
air. It must be covered over. 
(b) 4 with never 
Ex. 25 Never mix cleaners containing acid or ammonia with chlorine bleach. 
The chemical reaction releases the chlorine as a poisonous gas. 
2. 29 examples of the neg-TC type: 
(a) 4 with take care 
Ex. 26 To book the strip, fold the bottom third or more of the strip over the middle of 
the panel, pasted sides together, taking care not to  crease the wallpaper sharply 
a t  the fold. 
(b) 4 with be sure or make sure 
Ex. 27 To wash, load clothes into tub, making sure not t o  overfill it. 
(c) 22 with be careful 
Ex. 28 If your plans call for replacing the wood base molding with vinyl cove molding, 
be careful not t o  damage the walls as you remove the wood base. 
4.2 Different uses for different negative imperatives 
As far as semantics goes, it is clear that a DONT imperative could be used when a neg-TC 
one is used: an expression like take care not to do cr entails don't do a 4 .  In fact, in terse 
'1 collected data  from ttvo "how-to-do" books, both from the Sunset publication company - VI'aII Coverings 
and Tile - plus a few from detergent and toiletry containers. 
21 a m  not distinguishing between don't and do not. 
3Negative imperatives can also be formed by means of negated modals, such as shouldn't. Presumably such 
instances could be  reduced t o  DONT imperatives, although this characterization doesn't seem to be  totally 
appropriate. Given tha t  I found only one such example, I won't consider them in the  following. 
'It is not clear what entails really means here, given that  instructions are difficult t o  model in  the usual 
model-theoretic semantics. I a m  using this term in an intuitive sense. 
instructions only DONT imperatives are found. However, the instructions I have looked at 
come from instructional text, and there the two classes of negative imperatives are indeed used 
in different ways, that depend on the expectations S has on the intentions H will adopt - notice 
that in this proposal I will not address the problem of why S has such expectations. The two 
classes of negative imperatives pattern as follows: 
DONT imperatives. Don't do a appears to be used when S thinks that H is likely to  adopt 
the intention to perform a, and wants to prevent H from adopting it. 
That there is a correlation between S's expectation about the intentions which H is likely 
to adopt, the use of a DONT imperative, and the real likelihood that H adopts those 
intentions is shown by an infelicitous usage of a - really occurring! - DONT imperative: 
Ex. 29 # If you must replace a tile, first cut around the edges with a circular saw. Set 
the blade to the depth of the tile and don't damage adjoining tiles. 
Damaging x is hardly an intention that an agent would normally adopt, so that using a 
DONT imperative results in an infelicitous utterance: I will come back to this example in 
sect. 4.2.3. 
Neg-TC imperatives. A form like '(Do p. Take care not to do a "  appears to be used when S 
wants H to  perform a certain /3 and thinks that H may adopt the intention of performing it 
in an undesirable way, or that H may NOT adopt the intention of preventing an undesirable 
consequence of /3 - a describes such an undesirable feature. 
It appears that in general lexical items such as take care draw H's attention to something 
he may otherwise overlook, both in negative and in positive imperatives: 
Ex. 30 For paint spots on arms and hands, rub lightly with thinner, working quickly. On  
face and neck, dab the spots o n  with a cloth dipped in thinner. Be extremely careful to 
keep the thinner away froin your eyes. 
As when T C  verbs are used in negative imperatives, we have an action ,O "dab the spots off 
with a cloth dipped in  thinner" that has to be performed under the additional constraint 
o '(keeping the thinner away from your eyes". 
However, it appears that when TC verbs are used in negative imperatives there always is 
a p in discourse which a is meant to  constrain; on the other hand, a preliminary analysis 
of occurrences of TC verbs in positive imperatives shows that they can also be used in the 
absence of such p:  
Ex. 31 Be sure to read the adhesive manufacturer's instructions carefully. 
In this case, be sure seems to be used only for added emphasis, to stress the importance 
of reading the adhesive manufacturer's instructions carefully.. 
My conclusion, which I will support with further evidence in the rest of this chapter, is that 
neg-TC imperatives express more than simple negation. A thorough analysis of TC verbs 
used in positive imperatives will be instrumental in analyzing their behavior in negative 
imperatives too. 
I will now justify the different characterizations proposed for DONT and neg-TC imperatives; 
in sect. 4.3 I will provide more precise specifications. 
4.2.1 DONT imperatives 
The expression I will examine in this section is Don't do a ,  which may be used by S to  convey 
to  H that 
a is an undesirable alternative to  a ,El that S tells H to  do. a may come to H7s mind by 
analogy, as an alternative to some other ,El that S suggests, as in Ex. 23, whose relevant 
part is repeated here again for convenience: 
Ex. 32 Caring for the floor. A good paste wax - not a water-based wax - will give added 
protection to the wood. ... Dust-mop or vacuum your parquet floor as you would carpeting. 
Do not scrub or wet-mop the parquet. 
As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, the goal to  be achieved is y "cleaning the 
parquet". Notice that this is not stated explicitly, but requires a step of plan recognition: 
this step will probably take advantage of the fact that the whole paragraph is under the 
heading Caring for the floor, which is presented as subdivided into waxing and cleaning. 
S suggests to  H two methods to achieve this goal, and then prevents H from thinking that 
other apparently equivalent methods could be used. 
Ex. 32 is particularly "clean", in that the fact that scrub and wet-mop are (undesirable) 
alternatives with respect to dust-mop and vacuum can be easily inferred 
1. either by using an action inheritance hierarchy and by modeling all these actions as 
daughters of the same parent, clean floor; 
2. or by modeling them as different methods to achieve the same goal clean floor, and 
reasoning "backwards" from the goal to  understand what all these actions have in 
common. 
In other cases, the knowledge that may suggest cr to H as an alternative t o  ,El is more 
complex: 
Ex. 33 Step 4. Lift brush straight up, letting excess paint drip back into pail. Gently slap 
both sides of brush against inside of pail two or three times. Don't wipe brush across 
lip of pail, or bristles may separate into clumps, leaving less paint on  brush. 
Slap and wipe can be seen as alternative ways of getting rid of excess paint on the brush 
- in addition to  letting it drip, which is a slow way of accomplishing such goal. However, 
the fact that wipe is an alternative to  slap and that S feels the need to caution H against it 
comes from general knowledge about what people do with brushes loaded with an excessive 
amount of some kind of viscous substance. 
Notice the importance of the goal y in understanding Exs. 32 and 33: in the former the 
goal is cleaning the parquet, in the latter getting rid of excessive paint from the brush. 
Understanding that the relation between the actions to be performed - e.g. vacuum - 
and the undesirable ones - e.g. scrub - is one of alternative requires understanding the 
common goal that they all achieve. 
Therefore, DONT imperatives provide more evidence about the necessary role that goals 
play in understanding the relations between the described actions. 
a may state a general goal, independent from other actions in the discourse. S tells H not 
to adopt an intention relative to  some general tasks. The actions not t o  be performed are 
independent from other actions in the discourse. Of course, they may be related to  other 
more general goals, that either have already been established, such as Hang wallpaper in 
Ex. 34 below, or that are generally held as desirable, such as Don't put anybody's health 
i n  jeopardy, which underlies Ex. 24 above. Consider: 
Ex. 34 If you're using a lightweight or porous wallpaper, profit from these "don'ts": 
a. Don't hang the wallpaper over dark painted walls; it could show through. Lighten 
the walls with a pat, oil-base enamel undercoat before hanging the wallpuper. 
b. Don't paper over a dark colored or patterned wall covering. First, lighten the 
background with paint or lining paper. 
c. Don't hang the wallpaper over an existing wallpaper i f  the ink from the existing 
covering comes off; it could bleed through the new covering. To test, moisten a small piece 
of the covering with a clean sponge. If the ink comes ofS, seal the old covering first. 
Other. Don't do a can be used to tell H that an action ,O should not be followed by a ,  in 
particular if a affects the outcome of P. Consider: 
Ex. 35 Use a vinyl-to-vinyl paste for any type of border you plan to hang over wallpaper. 
To paste the border for hanging, cover the entire back with paste and book the strip; don't 
crease the folds. 
The action booking the strip creates folds; the action of creasing the folds is seen as inde- 
pendent from booking, and H is told not to perform it. 
There are few additional cases in which a DONT imperative is used to  caution H against 
possible side-effects of a certain action, or against possible undesirable ways of executing 
it ,  or to  give termination conditions for it: 
Ex. 36 The tiles will cut more easily if warmed in  sunlight or over a furnace vent. Don't 
overheat or the tiles may scorch or melt. 
Ex. 37 After washing the tile, rinse it thoroughly to remove detergent film; then wipe with 
a soft, dry cloth. For stubborn dirt, scrub tiles with a white, cleansing powder. Don't use 
a cleaner containing bleach; this can pull the color out of the colored grouts. 
Actually the generalization that DONT imperatives are used when S thinks H may adopt 
an intention to  do a does not seem to hold for the last two examples. For example, in 
Ex. 37, rather than consciously adopt the intention of using such a cleaner, it is more likely 
that H may overlook the fact that the cleaner he chooses contains bleach: as we will see, 
these are typical cases in which a neg-TC verb is used. 
I will come back to  these example in sect. 4.2.3. 
4.2.2 Neg-TC imperatives 
Neg-TC imperatives caution H against either undesirable ways of performing the action P that 
S intends H to perform, or undesirable consequences of P. That the negated action a is strictly 
linked to  P is also shown by the fact that many instances of neg-TC imperatives are adjuncts 
to  the matrix clause describing P ,  resulting in patterns such as '(Do P,  taking care not to do a". 
Given an imperative TC-verb not to do a ,  a may be: 
An undesirable way of performing P. The description of ,D is always underspecified, and 
therefore H has many degrees of freedom in executing it. Consider: 
Ex. 38 To make a piercing cut, first drill a hole in  the waste stock o n  the interior of the 
pattern. The diameter of the hole must be larger than the width of the blade. If you want to 
save the waste stock for later use, drill the hole near a corner in  the pattern. Be careful 
not to drill through the pattern line. 
p is drill a hole near a corner in  the pattern. The interpretation of near still leaves H 
some choices as regards the exact position where to  drill: S constrains them by saying Be 
careful not to drill through the pattern line, having already warned H that the hole must 
be larger than the width of the blade. 
An undesirable effect of P. 
1. The undesirable effect may spring from the manner in which H performs a certain 
action, and be entirely under H7s control: 
Ex. 39 Make a small 1/4-inch slit i n  the center of each area to be stuffed. Be careful 
not to snip the surface fabric. 
Another very common way of expressing a (generic) side-effect to  be avoided is by 
means of verbs like ruin, damage, mar etc: 
Ex. 40 When  nailing the panels, be careful not to mar the surfaces. 
Ex. 41 If your plans call for replacing the wood base molding with vinyl cove molding, 
be careful not t o  damage the walls as you remove the wood base. 
2. The undesirable consequence of P may depend on external laws not under H's control: 
the only thing H can do is prevent such events from happening. 
Ex. 42 To hang the border, begin at the least conspicuous corner. The work will go 
much faster i f  you have someone hold the folded section while you apply the border 
to the wall. Take care not to  drip paste onto the wall and be sure to remove 
excess paste. 
Gravity governs the dripping of paste: H has to  perform P in such a way that a does 
not happen. Notice that the agent can perceive a while doing P. In situations where 
the agent can't perceive a ,  it would be more felicitous to  say check that a doesn't 
happen. 
An explicit culmination point for actions that describe monotonic processes: 
Ex. 43 To wash, load clothes into tub, making su re  no t  t o  overfill i t .  
Load clothes into tub has a default culmination condition, which here is reinforced by the 
explicit making sure not to overfill it. 
4.2.3 F u r t h e r  e v i d e n c e  f o r  the t w o  classes of negative imperatives 
If the two types of negative imperatives do pattern in the way I illustrated, even if such pragmatic 
functions are not completely clear cut, we should expect to  find some cases in which the usage 
of one instead of the other results in an infelicitous utterance. As I mentioned in sect. 4.2, I did 
find such an example in my data, repeated here again for convenience: 
Ex. 44 # If you must replace a tile, first cut around the edges with a circular saw. Set the 
blade to the depth of the tile and don't  damage  adjoining tiles. 
As I said, S uses DONT imperatives when she thinks H is likely to adopt the intention to 
perform a ,  unless explicitly told not to. However, damage is hardly an intention that a person 
adopts in the context of building or repairing an artifact: rather, it is an undesirable side-effect 
that can result from a careless execution of a. 
I conducted an informal experiment to test whether my intuitions are correct, and whether 
using Take care not to damage adjoining tiles would be more felicitous. My informants agreed 
with my judgement, and pointed out that the presence of the conjunction is another source of 
infelicity. In fact, conjunction should be used to  relate two conjuncts that have the same function 
in discourse, but here the two conjuncts are, respectively, a subpart of the action of cutting the 
tile, and a possible negative consequence of such an action. However, all my informants rated 
conjunction as having a less conspicuous effect than using don't instead of take care not to. 
A last remark on the difference in the usage of these two classes of negative imperatives. 
That they achieve different results holds even for some apparent counterexamples, in which the 
two forms of negative imperatives seem to be used interchangeably. Consider the following pair 
- the first member is Ex. 35, repeated here for convenience: 
Ex. 45 a. Use a vinyl-to-vinyl paste for any type of border you plan to hang over wallpaper. To 
paste the border for Izanging, cover the entire back with paste and book the strip; don't crease 
t h e  folds. 
b. To book the strip, fold the bottom third or more of the strip over the middle of the panel, 
pasted sides together, t ak ing  care  n o t  to crease t h e  wal lpaper  sharp ly  at t h e  fold. 
Although similar, the two examples are not completely equivalent. 
In Ex. 45.a) the usage of a DONT imperative shows that the two actions of booking the strip 
and creasing the folds are seen as a sequence of separate actions. That is, S tells H to perform 
book the strip. Book the strip creates folds: S intends H not to perform crease on the result of 
the previous action, after such result has been created. 
In Ex. 45.b, S explains t o  H how to book a strip. Folding is explicitly mentioned as part of 
such "recipe"; creasing the folds is seen as a possible culmination of folding, and therefore as a 
part of booking the strips. 
In ch. 5 I show how the Ex. 45.a and .b can be treated - seefigs. 5.7 and 5.8. 
In sect. 4.2.1, I mentioned that Exs. 37 and 36 are counterexamples to  my characterization 
of DONT imperatives. This could be simply due to  the fact that the respective functions of 
DONT and neg-TC imperatives are not completely clear cut, because, as far as semantics goes, 
wherever a neg-TC imperative is used, a DONT imperative could be used; and in fact, DONT 
imperatives are used when the style of the instructions is terse. 
As regards Ex. 36 - Don't overheat [the tiles] - my feeling is that it could perhaps be accounted 
for in the same way Ex. 45.a is accounted for: namely, S shows that she is viewing overheating 
as a separate action from warming. 
4.3 Consequences for a cornputat ional model of instructions 
A first intuitive characterization of the different effects that DONT and neg- T C  imperatives 
have on the hearer could be: 
D O N T :  GOAL(H, NOT(perform(H, a)))  
As with purpose clauses, I will work out the details of the speaker / hearer model in the 
next chapter. An interesting parallel between purpose clauses and neg-TC imperatives arises: 
in the same way that the generator a is constrained by the generatee P contained in the purpose 
clause, so in many T C  verb not to a examples, the action ,L? to be performed is constrained by 
a. Also in this case, therefore, we have to resort to accommodation as the process that accounts 
for such inferences. 
One point that I have not addressed at all so far is why S has such expectations on the 
intentions that H may or may not adopt. Clearly S must have a user model of some sort in 
mind, but given that instructional text addresses an audience, not an individual, it must be the 
case that S has certain general expectations of her audience, such as level of expertise etc. To 
model S's beliefs in such a way that one can predict her expectations is a very interesting topic 
in itself, a topic that I don't plan to  address in the course of my thesis, but which I may touch 
upon. 
As far as the inferences that H has to perform to understand the (possible) relations of 
a to  p, I would first like to distinguish between internal and external relations between two 
actions: internal relations include a being a specialization, or a side-effect, or a culmination of P ;  
external include alternative, generation, enablement 5. I would characterize DONT imperatives 
as indicating an external and neg-TC an internal relation between a and P.  
D O N T  imperatives. If there is a P to which a relates, such a relation will typically be external, 
namely, a and ,L? will not be part of each other, or one a consequence of the other. To 
understand the relation holding between them, it is often the case that H needs to resort 
to a third action y,  for example a mutually accepted goal such as cleaning the parquet in 
Ex. 32. A step of plan recognition may be required to infer y. 
'The status of temporal relations with respect to being internal or external is not clear. 
As I said, style and conciseness can result in DONT imperatives being used instead of neg- 
T C  ones; therefore, we could hypothesize that by default H will start by postulating the 
existence of an external relation between a and ,L? in the presence of a DONT imperative. 
This default can be easily overridden, for example if H knows that the instructions he is 
dealing with are terse, so that only DONT imperatives are used; or if there is a particular 
lexical item, such as use, which, having little meaning by itself, triggers the hypothesis 
that there is an action to  which it can be internally related. 
Neg-TC imperatives. The relation between a and ,L? is internal. Sometimes the NL surface 
forms help in identifying such relations more precisely: in Exs. 38 and 39, such inference 
processes are made easier by the fact that either the same verb, drill, or two closely related 
verbs, (make a) slit and snip, are respectively used for ,L? and a. 
Chapter 5 
A computational model of 
instruct ions 
In this chapter, I will propose a model for understanding instructions, based on the evidence 
about the accommodation processes and about purpose clauses and negative imperatives I pre- 
sented in the previous chapters. Such model will account for the initial intentions H develops 
when he understands an imperative, and for the inference processes that he performs to  refine 
his initial understanding. 
Such model will be composed of 
1. a speaker / hearer model of imperatives based on [Cohen and Levesque, 1990b1, to  account 
for the initial intentions H adopts; 
2. an action representation formalism that integrates hybrid knowledge representation sys- 
tems and Jackendoff's lexical semantic representation, to  facilitate accommodation infer- 
ences; 
3. inference processes that build a structured representation of H's intentions - the plan 
graph. 
5.1 A speaker / hearer model of imperatives 
Following [Cohen and Levesque, 1990b1, I intend to  provide axioms on the basis of which the 
intentions H adopts while interpreting complex imperatives can be accounted for; in particular, 
I am talking about the intentions that H adopts as an initial "response" to the imperative. Such 
formalization could be used to model S's beliefs as well, in order to  predict the way in which 
she will phrase her instructions, but this is left for future work. 
One may wonder why it is necessary to  provide such an axiomatization, given that I will also 
provide a representation for the structure of H's intentions, and inference processes that build 
it. Conversely, one may wonder why building the structure of H's intentions is necessary, when 
through the axiomatization one can account for the intentions H adopts. The answer is that in 
fact these two parts of the model account for different parts of H's intentions. In particular: 
1. Such axiomatization is a declarative representation that links surface form of an utterance 
and H's intentions. Its first task is to model communication between S and H: therefore, 
starting with S's goals in uttering a certain kind of imperative, to account for the beliefs 
and intentions that H will adopt on the basis of such utterance. The second task of such 
axiomatization is to model what other intentions and beliefs H may adopt on the basis of 
those he derived from the input utterance I .  
Such formalization will then allow us to  make predictions about the intentions that H will 
adopt in a more principled way than by triggering procedures. It could also be useful to  
account for the way a speaker generates a certain kind of imperative, and ultimately, for 
generating such utterances. 
2. Having both the axiomatization and the inference processes that build the plan graph 
helps to keep distinct the intentions that the agent adopts as a "response" to the input 
instructions, and those that are adopted as a consequence of accessing the knowledge the 
agent has about the actions. Keeping them distinct is necessary because accommodation 
heavily depends on default assumptions. For example, by accommodation we will infer that 
in Turn screw to  loosen the real action to be performed is Turn screw counte~lockwise. 
This inference depends on the assumption that the screw in question is left-handed. If H 
later discovers that the screw is actually right-handed, his commitment to  loosening the 
screw should be maintained, while the commitment to turn the screw counterclockwise 
should be changed into the commitment to turn the screw clockwise. Therefore we must 
keep track of how these intentions were arrived at. 
To keep things simple, I will model a cooperative agent that will adopt intentions to 
perform all the actions that S instructs him to  do. Clearly, this obedient agent is severely 
limited; as we will see, in Cohen and Levesque's model H adopts an intention a if a is not 
contrary to his own goals. If in the future I extend the model to  deal with more complex 
agents, this feature will provide a point from where to start. 
On the other hand, such an axiomatization is not sufficient, and building the plan graph is 
necessary because the axiomatization only helps to  predict which intentions H will adopt, 
but not to  compute the exact objects of such intentions, or to  understand how different 
intentions relate to each other. The plan graph keeps track of such relations; for example, 
when interpreting sequences of imperatives, the structure of the plan graph built so far 
helps to  understand the next instruction. The axiomatic model only provides for the 
intentions that H adopts in answer to an imperative, not for how such intentions relate to 
others that H may have already adopted. 
5.1.1 Cohen and Levesque's illode1 
In [1990b], Cohen and Levesque present a model of a cooperative agent. I will first give an 
overview of the logic at the basis of their model, as they report on it in [1990a] 2 .  
'Pollack in her thesis [I9861 presents a formalization of beliefs and intentions that  is aimed a t  the latter task. 
Although she does address the problem of H modeling S' beliefs underlying a given request, she is not concerned 
with the task of mapping a given surface form into such beliefs and intentions. 
'In fact, I will exploit Allen's comments on their formalism in that  same book [Allen, 19901. 
T h e  logic 
Cohen and Levesque develop a modal logic whose model theory is based on a possible-worlds 
semantics. Their logic has four primary modal operators: BELief, GOAL, HAPPENS (which 
event happens next), DONE (which event has just occurred). 
T i m e  is expressed by means of time propositions, which are just numerals -for ease of exposition 
Cohen and Levesque represent them as dates. These will be true or false in a course of 
events a t  a given index if and only if the index is the same as that denoted by the time 
proposition. To express that an event E has to happen at time t ,  they use conjunction, 
namely, E A t .  
Action expressions.  They define primitive events, such as physical movements, etc. On top 
of those they build complex action expressions, by means of the standard operators of 
dynamic logic [Moore, 19801: composition " ;", non-deterministic choice " I " ,  test " ?", 
repetition " "". 
Tempora l  modalities. HAPPENS(a) is true at some index point on a world when there is 
a subsequent (future) index point on that world such that a describes the sequence of 
events between the two index points; DONE(a) is true at  some index point when there is 
a previous (past) index point such that a describes the sequence of events between the two 
index points. HAPPENS(x, a) and DONE(x, a) specify that x is the agent of a. Cohen 
and Levesque also use 0 and U, glossed as Eventually and Always respectively. 
BELief. They assume the usual Hintikka-style axiom schemata [Halpern and Moses, 19851: 
( l a )  I= v x  BEL (x, P )  A BEL ( 2, (P -+ q)) -+ BEL (x, q) 
( lb )  I= V x  BEL(x, p) -+ BEL(x, BEL(x, p)) 
( I c )  I= V x  1 BEL(x, p) + BEL(x, 1 BEL(x, p)) 
( Id )  I= V x  BEL(x, p) + 1 BEL(x, l p ) )  
They introduce KNOW by definition: 
Definition 1 II'NOW(x, p) = p A BEL(x, p) 
GOAL. An agent has many, possibly conflicting, desires. Among those he chooses his goals, 
namely, those desires he wants most to  see fulfilled. Goals are modeled as propositions 
true in all of the agent's chosen worlds. The following proposition holds: 
Propos i t ion  1 i= (BEL x p) + (GOAL x p) 
namely, worlds compatible with an agent's goals must be included in those compatible 
with his beliefs: given a set of worlds that are possible given what an agent believes, a 
subset of these are the worlds in which the agent's goals are achieved. 
Notice that - I am quoting from [Allen, 19901 - the formula G O A L ( x , p )  does not assert 
that the agent x has p as a goal in  the intuitive sense of the word. Rather, it says that 
p will be true i n  any world where the agent's goals are achieved. In some ways, the term 
((consequence-of-goals" might be a better term name for the operator. 
By means of the definition of goal, Cohen and Levesque define the concept of persistent goal, 
and on top of i t ,  the concept of intention. 
Pers is tent  goal, P-GOAL(x, p). An agent x has a P-GOAL p if he has a goal p that he 
believes currently t o  be false and that he will continue to choose - at least as long as a 
given condition q remains valid. At first, they define q as saying that the agent won't give 
up p until he has achieved it, or until he believes that p will never be true. Later, they relax 
this "fanaticism" requirement by defining a persistent goal relative to r, P-R-GOAL(x, p, 
r), where r is q with a third disjunct u added: the agent will keep the goal p until he has 
achieved it, or he believes that p will never be true, or he believes that another condition 
u is not true any more, where u can for example be the reason why the agent adopted p 
in the first place. 
Intent ion,  INTEND(x, p, q). Finally, they define intention as a kind of persistent goal - that 
is, a persistent goal to do an action, believing one is about to do it ,  or to  achieve some 
state of affairs, believing one is about to achieve it. Being a P-R-GOAL, an intention will 
be relative to a certain condition q 3 .  
A model  for  ra t ional  interact ion 
By means of the logic defined above, Cohen and Levesque develop a model for rational intemc- 
tion. They model agents as being sincere and helpful. 
An agent x is sincere with respect to another agent y and a certain proposition p,  if, whenever 
x has chosen to do something next in order to cause y to believe p,  x has chosen to  bring it 
about that y knows p, i.e. that y believes p, and p holds. 
An agent x is helpful to another agent y if, for any action a, x adopts y's goal that x will 
eventually do a. Helpfulness is a disposition only: not taking on another agent's goals does 
not indicate unhelpfulness, since the agent may have reasons for not wanting the goal. The 
helpfulness assumption is as follows 4:  
Assumpt ion  1 HELPFUL(x,y) A 
BEL(x, GOAL(y, O(DONE(x, a ) ) )  A 
i(GOAL(x, 07(DONE(x, a ) )  
+ 
INTEND(x, a, 
[HELPFUL(x, y) A GOAL(y, ODONE(x, a))])  
The preceding assumption reads as follows. If agent x 
a is HELPFUL to agent y; 
a believes that y wants him to perform a, namely, y has the goal that x will eventually 
perform a; 
3 ~ c t u a l l y ,  they define two operators, INTEND1 and INTEND2, distinguished because the  object of the  in- 
tention is respectively actions and states of affairs. Given tha t  I will talk only about intentions to  d o  an action, 
namely, INTEND1, I will drop the  subscript. 
*I report formulas from [Cohen and Levesque, 1990bl verbatim, apart  from possibly substituting variable names 
t o  keep them consistent with the abbreviations I have used in this proposal. 
a doesn't have any reason not to perform a, namely, he doesn't have among his own goals 
that he will never perform a ,  
then x will commit to  a, under the assumption that x remains helpfully disposed and that y 
doesn't change his mind with respect to  x doing a. 
Cohen and Levesque define the notions of Alternating BELief and Belief in Mutual Belief, 
ABEL and BMB respectively: 
Definition 2 ABEL(n, x,  y, p)  = BEL(  x, BEL(  y, B E L  (x , . . .  BEL(  x, p )  ...) 
L + 'V 
n n 
Definition 3 BMB(  x, y, p) = V n  ABEL(  n,  x, y, p) 
Finally, Cohen and Levesque characterize utterance properties. They start by giving a general 
definition relating an utterance in a certain syntactic mode @ and the beliefs that H adopts as 
a consequence of such utterance. Such definition, informally stated, is: 
Definition 4 If H believes that e was just done, where e is the uttering by S of a sentence $ i n  
syntactic mode a, and i f  H does not believe that e was done insincerely regarding certain core 
attitudes A associated with utterances of that type, then H believes that A hold. 
In the formal definition, ABEL, not BEL, is used, and it is required that ABEL holds at any 
level of alternating belief. Therefore, if at each level S's sincerity is believed, we obtain that S 
and H mutually believe A. The properties characterizing the various syntactic modes a ' s  are 
modeled by axioms of the sort 
As far as imperatives are concerned, Cohen and Levesque attribute them the following prop- 
erty: 
After speaker S's imperative to addressee H to do action a, if H does not think that 
S was insincere about his wanting H to do a - that is, if H does not believe that S 
wanted H to  believe falsely that S wants H to do a - then H believes that S wants H 
to do a. 
This translates t o  the following domain axiom for imperatives 
Axiom 1 I= IMPERATIVE($) 
GOAL(S, 0[3 a [ DONE(H, a )  A 
FULFILL-CONDS(#J, a)]) 
namely, S's GOAL when uttering the imperative C$ is that H performs a which FULFILLS the 
satisfaction conditions imposed by sentence 4. In [1990b, p.2351, Cohen and Levesque acknowl- 
edge that FULFILL-CONDS is just a placeholder for a semantic theory that can characterize 
the meanings of imperatives. The only requirement we make for analyzing imperatives is that 
such a semantic theory have the capacity to supply predicates (or properties) that are true of 
events, especially the utterance event itself. 
By applying def. 4 to Axiom 1, we can conclude 
BMB(S, H, GOAL(S, 0 [ 3 a  [DONE(H, a )  A 
FULFILL-CONDS(q5, a)]])) 
If we substitute such belief into the second conjunct in the antecedent of Assum. 1, we can 
' conclude: 
INTEND(x, a ,  [HELPFUL(x, y) A GOAL(y, ODONE(x, a))] 
where a is the a relative to S's desires. 
5.1.2 Extensions to Cohen and Levesque's model 
I will now refine the axiom for imperatives given above by providing axioms first for positive 
imperatives containing purpose clauses and then for negative imperatives. The reader may 
wonder why the general axiom for imperatives is not sufficient: one might as well leave it as 
it is, and reason about intentions and objects to  intentions in a different part of the model. 
However, this would not be correct. I claim that, after S utters an imperative containing a 
purpose clause or a neg-TC, H adopts more specific intentions than those predicted by Axiom 
1: therefore, the model must be able to  capture these more specific effects. 
Purpose Clauses 
In Ch. 3, I attributed the following property to positive imperatives containing purpose clauses: 
Do a to do ,L? is used to  tell H that he should adopt the intention to do P; and that a contributes 
to achieving P, which in turn constrains the interpretation / execution of a. I also observed 
that,  although S's intention is that H also adopts a as one of his intentions, P has priority: if 
H adopts another method y to  achieve P, S won't object to it, as long as y is not against S's 
intentions and beliefs 5 .  
Finally, I defined two kinds of accommodation processes, one that computes a more specific 
action description a', the other that coillputes the assumptions under which the relation between 
a and ,L? makes sense. 
I will provide two axioms: the former, Axiom 2, models the communicative act between S 
and H. On the basis of Axiom 2 and other axioms previously established, I will conclude what 
intentions and beliefs H adopts, upon hearing or reading such an imperative. By applying the 
other axiom, Axiom 3, t o  such newly acquired intentions and beliefs, I will model the beliefs 
and intentions that H holds with respect to the objects of the accommodation inferences. 
Axiom 2 is as follows - FULFILL-CONDS-PC is a specialized version of FULFILL-CONDS, 
B denotes the purpose clause in q5, CONTRIBUTES is a generic name for the relation between a 
and ,O that is embodied in purpose clauses; also notice that I am using A and B to  keep distinct 
surface form and action expressions: 
5 ~ o r  example, a teacher telling a student study more to get better marks, won't be satisfied if H adopts the 
"method" of cheating on the exam, in order to  get better marks. 
Axiom 2 Do-A-to-do-B($) 
b) GOAL(S, 0 [3 a [ DONE(H, a )  A 
FULFILL- CONDS-PC(A, a )  
BEL(H, CONTRIBUTES (HAPPENS(H, a ) ,  
HAPPENS(H, P)))11) 
Substituting the first conjunct (2.a) into the antecedent of the helpfulness assumption - 
Assum. 1, we get 
where q are the assumptions of helpfulness etc., as discussed above. 
As regards the second conjunct (2.b), i t  may be questionable whether DONE (H, a )  should 
be included, given my observation above that the goal ,O has more importance than a :  however, 
I will keep it  for the moment. Reasoning exactly as for (2.a), we will obtain 
Moreover, from the belief part of 2.b, Def. 4, and an axiom relative to informative acts 6, we 
will get 
BMB(S, H, CONTRIBUTES ( HAPPENS (H, a ) ,  HAPPENS (H, P))) 
I will now introduce the second axiom, that no longer concerns the communicative situation, but 
characterizes H's mental processes after he has acquired the intentions of doing ,B and a, and the 
belief that a contributes t o  achieving P, from a purpose clause: either H will adopt the intention 
to  perform a', which is a constrained by P ;  or there will be another belief, $, that H has to 
have in order for the CONTRIBUTES relation to  make sense - in the axiom, CONSTRAINED 
is meant to  be true of an action a' which is a constrained by the fact that a CONTRIBUTES 
to p, and CONTRIBUTESl is the CONTRIBUTES relation "augmented" with the assumption 
$: 
6To be defined. 
Axiom 3 'F INTEND(H, P, q) A INTEND(H, a )  A 
BEL(H, CONTRIBUTES ( HAPPENS (H, a ) ,  HAPPENS (H, P))) 
a) [3a' [ INTEND(H, a', q) A 
BEL(H, CONSTRAINED 
(a', a, CONTRIBUTES (HAPPENS (H, a ) ,  
HAPPENS(H, P))) A 
BEL(H, CONTRIBUTES (HAPPENS (H, a'), HAPPENS (H, P)))] 
v 
b) [ BEL(H7 $1 A 
BEL(H, CONTRIBUTESl ( HAPPENS (H, a ) ,  HAPPENS (H, P), $))I 
Disjunct a) is meant to  capture the first kind of accommodation, namely, the fact that the 
action which H has to perform may be a more specialized version of a ;  notice that INTEND(H, 
a', q) is supposed t o  "substitute", in some sense, INTEND(H, a ,  q). Actually i t  is consistent 
that the two intentions coexist, because a is an abstraction of a': however, I wonder whether 
having them coexist is a perspicuous representation of H's intentions - I will address this point 
in my future work. 
Disjunct b) is meant to capture the second kind of accommodation, the one that takes 
place when the CONTRIBUTES relation needs an assumption $ in order to make sense. 
CONTRIBUTESl is very similar, at least intuitively, to  CGEN - conditional generation - that 
Pollack defined [1986]: the definition of conditional generation rests on the assumption that there 
are conditions that have to hold for the generation relation to go through. CONTRIBUTESl 
is more general than CGEN, in that it should subsume both generation and enablement, and 
that there are assumptions that help "make sense" of it; the definitions of CONTRIBUTES and 
CONTRIBUTESl are left for future work. 
Axiom 3 is clearly descriptive: it just mentions that H believes that a more specific a' 
contributes to ,8, or that there is an assumption $ that under which CONTRIBUTES( HAP- 
PENS (H, a ) ,  HAPPENS(H, P)) goes through. However, nothing is said about how a' or $ 
are arrived at .  Instead of providing inference rules to  compute such objects, I'd rather keep the 
axioms as a way to account for the initial intentions H adopts, and I will use other parts of the 
model - namely, the inferences that build the plan graph - to  compute the actual objects of H7s 
intentions. 
Finally, I would like t o  point out that Axiom 3, as stated, is incorrect: in fact, it may be 
applied every time H intends a certain P, and he believes there is an a that contributes to P. 
This would entail, for example, that, if H knows more than one a that contributes to  P,  H can 
commit to  all such a's, possibly modified to  be a'. Instead, this axiom should be applicable only 
when there is some more evidence for H committing to a', as for example the fact that these 
intentions and beliefs come from purpose clauses. This applicability condition has to be added. 
Negative imperatives 
On the basis of the results established in ch. 4, I propose the following characterizations: 
DONT imperatives. Don't do A is used when S thinks that H is likely to  adopt the intention 
to perform a, and wants t o  prevent H from adopting it. 
Axiom 4 (DONT) + Don't-do-A(4) 
* 
GOAL(S, [i 3 a [DONE(H, a )  A 
FULFILL-CONDS-DONT(A, a)]]) 
From Axiom 4, the Helpfulness assumption, and Def. 4, we can conclude 
INTEND(H, ol(DONE(H, a ) ) ,  q) 
As the reader may recall, there are cases in which DONT imperatives behave like neg-TC 
imperatives:'in those cases, Axiom 4 should not apply. Given that Axiom 4 describes the 
default use of DONT imperatives, it should probably be restated as an assumption. 
Neg-TC imperatives. "Do B. Take care not to do A'' is used when S wants H to  perform B 
and thinks that H may NOT adopt the intention of preventing an undesirable consequence 
of B, or may adopt the intention of performing B in an undesirable way - where A describes 
the undesirable feature to  be avoided. 
The schema for neg-TC imperatives is similar to the one for purpose clauses, therefore 
highlighting the similarity of these two constructions. I will provide two axioms, Axioms 
5 and 6: the former will model the communicative act taking place between S and H, and 
will allow me to infer the intentions and beliefs that H derives from the utterance. The 
latter axiom, applied to the conclusions of the former, will model the reasoning that H 
engages in subsequently. 
A first approximation for Axiom 5 follows - AVOID (IN ( HAPPENS( H, P), HAP- 
PENS(H, a ) ) )  indicates that a is an undesirable feature of P: 
Axiom 5 (neg-TC) Do-B.-Talre-care-not-to-do-A(4) 
==+ 
GOAL(S, 0 [3P [ DONE(H, P )  A 
FULFILL-CONDS(B, P)]]) A 
GOAL(S, 0 [3a [ BMB(S, H, 
AVOID ( IN ( HAPPENS (H, P), 
HAPPENS (H, a)))) A 
FULFILL-CONDS-neg-TC(A, a)]]) 
As for purpose clauses, we want now conclude that, from the intentions and beliefs derived 
from the utterance of a neg-TC imperative, H will derive a further intention to do P 
modified to  avoid a: 
Axiom 6 INTEND(H, P, q) A BEL(H, AVOID (IN (HAPPENS (H, P), HAPPENS(H, a)))) 
3P' [INTEND(H, PI, q) A 
CONSTRAINED(Pt, P, AVOID (IN (HAPPENS (H, P), HAPPENS (H, a)))]  
As I said, this is just a first attempt to model neg-TC imperatives, and there are several 
problems with it. One is the AVOID operator that I introduced above: it is not clear what 
it exactly means. One alternative would be to model a as a condition not to be satisfied 
by P, a condition that could be taken care of by FULFILL-CONDS(B, P). 
Another problem is that Axiom 5 requires that B be known. This is the case when the 
neg-TC imperative is contained in an adjunct, so that B is the action described in the 
corresponding matrix clause. However, if the neg-TC imperative is contained in a matrix 
clause, it is not known a priori what B is: H has to understand to  which B A relates. 
5.1.3 Further work on the model 
For the time being, I have simply - and very roughly! - sketched axioms for modeling particular 
kinds of imperatives. Some issues that clearly need to  be addressed are: 
1. Refine the formalization, making sure that it actually models the imperatives as they 
should be modeled - for example, I pointed out that the applicability of Axiom 3 should 
be restricted, that Axiom 4 should probably restated as an assumption, and that there 
are problems with Axiom 5. I also have to  define CONSTRAINED, CONTRIBUTES, 
CONTRIBUTESl and AVOID. For example, the operator AVOID may be expressible 
by means of the already defined action constructors and modal operators; however, this 
doesn't seem possible as long as there is no way of expressing simultaneity between actions, 
in the sense of being able to  express While doing P ,  do (or don't do) a. 
2. The treatment of time is a bit simplistic, as [Allen, 19901 remarks. I have to  check what 
time properties I need in my model: I already mentioned simultaneity. 
3. Finally, I need to  make sure that H's intentions as inferred by means of the axioms I 
propose and as depicted in the plan graph are consistent and compatible with each other. 
For example, the plan graph may include actions that are not explicitly mentioned in 
the input instructions - what is the status of such actions with respect to  the intentions 
inferred from the axioms? 
5.2 The action representation formalism 
I will start by making some observations on the features that an action representation formalism 
should include to  be adequate to model NL descriptions of actions - these observations rest on the 
analysis of purpose clauses and negative imperatives that I presented in the previous chapters, 
and on analysis of other constructions, such as free adjuncts and check constructions, on which 
I reported elsewhere [Webber and Di Eugenio, 19901. Notice that in the whole discussion action 
is meant as action type, and action description as action type description. 
Individual  ac t ion  descriptions.  
1. It has probably become obvious by now, but let me point out that, like individuals, 
sets of individuals, propositions [Bach, 19901 etc. actions should be part of the un- 
derlying ontology of the representation formalism. This has also been advocated by 
Jackendoff, who includes ACTION among his ontological categories and justifies it 
by means of our ability to refer to an action - I did it, or to ask questions about 
them - W h a t  did you do? [Jackendoff, 19831. 
2. Action descriptions can always be further specified. Consider: 
Ex. 46 a) Apply paste to the wall. 
b) Using a paint roller or brush, apply paste t o  the wall. 
c )  Using a paint roller or brush, apply paste to the wall, 
starting at the ceiling line and pasting down a few feet and 
covering an area a few inches wider than the width of the fabric. 
Therefore the formalism must be able to deal with action description that may not ex- 
actly correspond to the stored knowledge, and it must be able to  support computation 
of relations between action descriptions that differ in level of specificity. 
3. The formalism must be able to  represent not just the usual participants in an action 
such as agent or patient, but also means, manner, direction, extent etc. 
Relations between actions. The formalism must be able to represent various relations be- 
tween actions, such as temporal relations, generation and enablement. 
Another relation that the formalism should be able to account for is test,  relating two 
actions one of which is a test on the outcome or execution of the other. Consider: 
Ex. 47 To attach the wires to the new switch, use the paper clip to move the springtype 
clip aside and slip the wires into place. Tug gently on each wire to make sure it's secure. 
Such constructions are fairly frequent in instructions: they are marked by verbs such as 
check, make sure, be certain .. . plus a subordinate clause introduced by the complementizer 
that which describes a state a. They are used to tell H to  check whether a certain state 
a holds; pragmatically, they also alert H to  the fact that, if a doesn't hold, he should do 
something to  bring a about. 
In Ex. 47, the purpose clause of the second sentence provides a constraint on the outcome of 
attaching wires to the new switch -that the attachment be secure. Notice that, consistently 
with my analysis of purpose clauses, tug gently on each wire generates make sure it's secure. 
In this example, the corrective action is not explicit. 
In Cohen and Levesque's logic there is an operator for test, " ?". However, " ?" is applied 
to states of the world, not to pairs of actions. Including the test relation in my formalism 
is left for future work. 
It seems to  me that knowledge about individual actions is typically definitional, while knowl- 
edge about relations between actions is not. The problem is how to represent these different 
kinds of knowledge. 
The first possible solution would of course be to  adopt a uniform representation system, and 
therefore disregard such difference; however, this would not take advantage of the different infer- 
ence mechanisms that are associated with different kinds of knowledge. Consider the following 
instruction: 
Ex. 48 Cut the square along a perpenclicular axis to create two triangles. 
The relation between cut the square along a perpendicular axis and create two triangles is at 
least odd, if not ill-formed, because cutting a square along an axis won't create two triangles. 
However, the two action descriptions by themselves are perfectly well-formed. In order to  track 
down the ill-formedness above, a homogeneous representation system that does not support 
distinguishing between different kinds of knowledge could e.g. try to prove that cut the square 
along a perpendicular axis is not a well-formed description, a clearly undesirable behavior. 
I will therefore propose to  capture definitional information about actions by means of the 
T-Box of a hybrid system - see next section - and information about relations between actions 
by means of an action library. The semantic primitives of such representation will be the same 
that Jackendoff defines as part of Conceptual Structures. 
In the following, I will first describe hybrid systenls, and show that they facilitate computing 
the first kind of accommodation, namely, inferring a more specific description of an action; then 
describe Jackendoff's Conceptual Structures, and show how such representation can express 
knowledge about individual actions, and ultimately to  compute the second kind of accommoda- 
tion, namely, inferring assumptions. Finally, I will show why their integration is necessary. 
5.2.1 Hybrid Systems 
Hybrid Knowledge Representation systems, such as KRYPTON [Brachman et al., 1983b1, KL- 
TWO [Vilain, 19851, and CLASSIC [Brachman et aI., 19901, stemmed from the KL-ONE formal- 
ism [Brachman and Schmolze, 19851. They are composed of two parts: a terminological part, or 
T-Box, that is used to define terms, and an assertional part, or A-Box, used to assert facts or 
beliefs. 
All T-Box information is definitional in nature. The T-box language has two main categories, 
concepts and roles, roughly corresponding to  frames and slots. Concepts are organized in a 
hierarchy of structured terms. The relation between terms in the hierarchy is subsumption, 
which captures the notion that all instances of the subsumed concept are by definition instances 
of its subsuming concepts. 
The T-Box is equipped with a classification algorithm, which takes a concept and determines 
the subsumption relations between it and all the other concepts in a given Knowledge Base. By 
means of the classification algorithm, a new concept can be automatically assimilated into the 
taxonomy by "placing it in the right place", i.e. linking it to  its most specific subsumers and its 
most general subsumees. Given that the classification algorithm is able to deal with concepts it 
has never seen before, the T-Box can be seen as an infinite virtual lattice. 
The A-box uses first-order logic 7.  The terms of this logic are defined in the T-Box (A-box 
and T-Box share a symbol table). 
To adapt such structures to representing actions, verb phrases have to  map to concepts in 
the T-Box. In the T-box that I will construct, verbs will be concepts decomposed according to  
Jackendoff's Conceptual Structures. 
The A-Box will contain assertions about "individuals", which will be the instances of concepts 
obtained as a result of the parsing process s .  
7The A-Box language is generally somewhat restricted, for example function-free, in order to make theorem 
proving computationally tractable. 
'Here assertions should be understood as regarding the content of the NL input, and individuals are individual 
action descriptions, not action tokens - this approach is similar to the one adopted in PSI-KLONE [Brachman et 
al., 19791. 
I will also develop a third box, an action library, which will be devoted to representing 
the rest of the knowledge about actions, such as knowledge of the effects expected to occur 
when an action of a given type is performed, and information about relations between action- 
types: temporal, generation, enablement, testing. This knowledge can be seen as common 
sense planning knowledge, which includes facts such as t o  loosen a screw, you have to turn it 
counterclockwise, but not complex recipes to achieve a certain goal [Balkanski, 19901, such as 
how to  assemble a piece of furniture. I would like to stress that the knowledge encoded in 
the action library relates to individual action descriptions and their relations to  one another, 
basically to  the individual blocks that should be used to build more complex plans; such plans 
will be contained in the plan library, with which I am not currently concerned. 
Accommodation: computing more specific actions 
A question that needs to be answered at this point is: why use a hybrid KR system, with 
the added complexity that classification involves, instead of using a simpler representation aug- 
mented with an inheritance mechanism? The answer is that in fact I need the power of clas- 
sification to provide the flexibility to deal with concepts that don't exactly correspond to the 
stored knowledge. 
Let's go back to Ex. 6 - Cut the square i n  half to create two triangles. 
Consider a T-Box such as the one shown in Fig. 5.1 - notice that, to keep things simple, I 
have used intuitively appealing names for concepts and roles: this T-Box is not expressed in 
Jackendoff's terms, and some of the names I use, such as location and result, are not linguistically 
well motivated either. 
Given Ex. 6 as input, the individual action description a - cut (the) square i n  half - will 
be asserted in the A-Box and recognized as an instance of the concept cut and as an abstraction 
of y - cut (a) square in  half along the diagonal, as shown in Fig. 5.2.  At this point, inference 
mechanisms that I will describe in more detail later will infer that the action to be performed 
is actually y and not a: this can be inferred by exploiting the context in which a appears. The 
context is composed by ,f3 (the goal create two triangles), the fact that y generates ,f?, and the 
position of a in the T-Box, in particular its position with respect to y. This implements one of 
the two kinds of accommodation that I described in ch. 2 - see fig. 2.2.  
Notice that by exploiting the classification process we can also deal with cases in which a 
is more specific than y, or in which a is in conflict with y, such as in Ex. 48. In this case we 
can recognize that y = cut the square in  half along the diagonal and a = cut the square along a 
perpendicular axis are in conflict, because the role fillers of location on a and y are non-unifiable, 
being along(perpendicu1ar-axis) and along(diagona2) respectively. I am not planning to  address 
the issue of what strategies should be adopted in case such a conflict is detected: presumably, 
some kind of interaction with the user could be triggered. 
In conclusion, given Do a to do p, and a stored generation relation GEN(y, P ,  agent,  t )  - 
see sect. 5.2.3 on the representation of generation and enablement: 
1. If y is an ancestor of a, a is the action to be performed. 
2. If a is an ancestor of y ,  we can assume that y is the action to  be performed. 
'AS I already mentioned, I assume there is a discourse model that takes care of definite reference etc. 
0 concept 
> IS-A 
role 
. . . . . . .+ IS-A * - V/R (Value Restriction) 
Figure 5.1: A portion of the action hierarchy 
A-BOX 
0 individual ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, instantiates 
Figure 5.2: Dealing with less specific action descriptions 
3. If cr and y are not ancestors of each other, but they can be unified - i.e. all the information 
they provide is compatible, as in the case of cut the square carefully and cut the square in 
half along the diagonal - then their unification cr U y is the action to  be executed. 
4. If cr and y are not ancestors of each other, and they provide conflicting information - such 
as cut the square along the axis and cut the square along the diagonal - then signal failure. 
This could trigger interaction with the user. 
5.2.2 Jackendoff's Collceptual Structures 
Work done in lexical semantics, in particular Jackendoff's Conceptual Structures [Jackendoff, 
19901, proves to be very useful to represent action descriptions in a linguistically motivated way, 
as [Di Eugenio and White, 19911 shows. As we will see, there is significant mileage to be gained 
from using a decompositional theory of meaning, because the semantic primitives do manage 
to  capture important generalizations. In the rest of this section, I will introduce the notation 
and some minor modifications to the theory as presented in [White, 19911, and I will apply the 
notation to the representation of the clause Go into the other room lo. 
In Jackendoff's theory, an entity may be of ontological type Thing, Place, Path, Event, State, 
Munner or Property. The conceptual structure for a room is shown in (5.2a) below: 
Square brackets indicate an entity of type Thing meeting the enclosed featural description. 
Small caps indicate atoms in conceptual structure, which serve as links to  other systems of 
representation; for example, the conceptual structure for a kitchen (5.2b) differs from that of a 
room only in its choice of constant. Jackendoff leaves the determination of their similarities and 
differences to  a system of representation better suited to  the task, able to  address perceptual 
distinctions. 
To distinguish instances of a type, in [Zwarts and Verkuyl, 19911 it is required that every 
conceptual structure have an index, as in (5.3): 
Conceptual structures may also contain complex features generated by conceptual functions 
over other conceptual structures. For example, the conceptual function IN: Thing + Place may 
be used to  represent the location in  the room as shown in (5.4a) below. Likewise, the function 
TO: Place + Path describes a path that ends in the specified place, as shown in (5.4b): 
( 5 . 4 ~ )  is an equivalent representation of (5.4b), where the index l stands for the entire con- 
stituent. This move considerably lessens the typographical burden of representing large con- 
''All modifications to Jackendoff's theory have been developed by Mike White. 
ceptual structures; to  further lessen this burden, indices and ontological types will often be left 
out. 
To complete our clausel1, i t  remains only to add the conceptual function GO: Thing x Path 
+ Event: 
As there is no explicit subject in our clause, the constituent i (pragmatically, the AGENT) in 
(5.5) is left unspecified. 
To distinguish Walk into the other room from (5.5)) an indication of manner should be 
included:12 
The final modification to  Jackendoff's theory is the addition of a new semantic field. Semantic 
fields, such as Spatial and Possessional, are intended to  capture the similarities between sentences 
like Jack went into the other room and The gift went to Bill, as shown in (5.7) below: 
The idea is that verbs like go leave the semantic field underspecified, whereas verbs like donate 
specify a particular field. In addition to these semantic fields, White proposes to add a new 
one called Control. It is intended to  represent the functional notion of having control over some 
object. For example, in sports, the meanings of having the ball, keeping the ball, getting the 
ball, and losing the ball embody this notion, and are clearly quite distinct from their Spatial 
and Possessional counterparts. The inclusion of this new field let's us capture these additional 
similarities in an analogous way. The similarity between Jack has the money and Jack has the 
ball, for instance, is shown in (5.8): 
5.2.3 The action library 
The action library contains both simple plans that represent common sense knowledge about 
individual actions, and relations such as generation and enablement between individual actions. 
These plans are used as building blocks that can be manipulated to form more complex plans, 
that will be contained in a separate plan library. 
llIgnoring, of course, t h e  meaning of other for now. 
12Though this is  clearly intended, Jackendoff never explicitly represents such a distinction. 
Header 
[CAUSE([AGENT];, [GOsp(j, k)])] [ FRoM([AT(i)I) ] 
TO ( 1 )  k 
Body 
- [GOsp([i, [TO([AT(j)l)I)l,, 
- [CAUSE(i, [GOctri(j, [TO([AT(.1)I)I)I)I, 
73 
- Annotations - 
- yl enables yz enables ys 
Qualifiers 
- [NOT BEsp(j ,  91 
Effects 
- [BEsp(j, 111 
Figure 5.3: A Move Something Sonzewhere Action. 
Individual actions 
I will refer to  the move-action library entry shown in Figure 5.3, which might be described as 
follows: go t o  where j is, get control over i t ,  then take it t o  1 - from [Di Eugenio and White, 
1991].13 
Actions have a header and a body, both expressed in terms of Jackendoff's semantic primitives. 
The terminology, header and body, is reminiscent of STRIPS [Fikes and Nilsson, 19711; however 
I express the relations between these components in terms of enublement and generation-for 
example the body generates its header. 
The representation does not employ preconditions, because preconditions concern states, 
but instructions describe actions far more frequently than states. More importantly, it is very 
13This do-it-yourself method is but one way to move something from where it is to somewhere else. Other 
methods would be listed separately in the action library. 
difficult to draw the line between what is a precondition and what is part of the body of the 
action. One could say that the body of a move-action simply consists of a transfer of an object 
from one place to another; and that a precondition for a move-action is having control over 
that object. However, consider a heavy object: the agent will start exerting force to lift i t ,  and 
then carry it to the other location. It is not obvious whether the lifting action is still part of 
achieving the precondition, or already part of the body. Therefore, my point of view is that there 
are only actions, which may be substeps in executing another action - namely, they may belong 
to  a sequence that generates the header 14. Actually, the name sequence may be misleading, 
because it conveys the idea of a total temporal order holding between the actions belonging 
to  the sequence. Actions in a body may have other relations holding between them, such as 
enablement in Fig. 5.3, and the order may be partial. The annotations on the body specify the 
relations between the subactions. 
From the planning tradition, I retain the notions of qualifiers and eflects. Qualifiers are 
conditions that make an action relevant: for example, unplug x is relevant only if x is plugged. 
Qualifiers are useful for computing assumptions-see sec. 5.2.3. 
Notice the importance of using a representation such as Jackendoff's: it helps us capture the 
common characteristics of different actions, e.g. get and carry. The semantic representation for 
carry would also match the generic move-action template, and would add to it a qualification 
such as 
(9) [ ~ a n n e r  w I T H ( [ ~ h i n ~  HANDS])] 
Having such a representation is also useful for computing qualifiers and effects in a systematic 
way: they can be precompiled from the representation itself. For example, for every action 
including a component S of j moving from where it is to 1 in its header, i.e. 
we know that after S, j must be at 1, therefore we can include this in the effects of the action. 
Given the further restriction that j cannot be in two places at once, we may infer that j cannot 
be at 1 now, and thus precompute the qualifier.15 
Relations between actions 
We have already seen that relations such as generation, enablement and temporal relations are 
used in the body of an action. Such relations, in particular generation, are also used to  express 
simple common sense knowledge about actions, such as the simple plan to loosen a screw, turn 
it counterclockwise 16. I will now discuss these relations in more detail. 
a Temporal relations: I will adopt relations derived from Allen's temporal logic [1984]. Notice 
that the formalism must be able to  represent possibly underspecified temporal relations. 
Consider: 
'*On preconditions, see also Pollack's position [1986], which I discussed in ch. 3. 
15 Jackendoff suggests something analogous with his inference rules, which have yet t o  be formalized. 
1 6 ~ h e  actions appearing in these simple plans must be defined in other parts of the  action library. 
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Ex. 49 Pour mixture over cheese in casserole, spreading evenly. 
Although this description can be seen as a single action (pouring having spreading as a 
side-effect) or as two separate actions, consider it from the latter point of view. It is 
clear that spreading has to  begin after pouring has begun, but the temporal relationship 
.of the two actions is not otherwise constrained. An agent could pour the mixture and, 
after having poured it ,  spread it; or hold the receptacle that contains the mixture with 
one hand, pouring it and simultaneously spreading the mixture with the other hand; or 
pour the mixture and simultaneously have a second agent spread it. The choice, possibly 
constrained by the state of the world, will be made at the moment of executing the action. 
Such underspecificity can be represented in Allen's logic presumably by means of disjunc- 
tion, e.g. 
where BEFORE(t1, t2)  means that tl is before t2 ,  and they don't overlap in any way; 
OVERLAP(tl, t2) means that t l  starts before t2 ,  and they overlap. 
a Generation. Recall that the defining conditions for generation are: a and P are simulta- 
neous, a is not part of doing P, and when a occurs, a set of conditions C hold, such that 
the joint occurrence of a and C imply the occurrence of P. 
As a starting point, I adopt the representation of generation put forward by Pollack - I 
will modify i t  if the need arises: 
Definition 5 GEN(a, P, agent, t )  
3 C [ (i) V agentl, Vtl [ HOLDS(C, t l)  A OCCURS(a, agentl, t l)  
-, OCCURS(P, agentl, tl)] 
(ii) 3 agent2, 3t2 [OCCURS(a, agent2, t2) A 
1 OCCURS(P, agent2, t2)] 
(iii) 3 agent,, 3t3 [HOLDS(C, t3) A 1 OCCURS(P, agent3, t3)] A 
(iv) HOLDS(C,t)] 
The four clauses in Def. 5 read as follows: 
(i) if condition C holds and action a occurs a t  time tl, then action ,6 occurs a t  the same 
time tl ;  
(ii) a by itself doesn't entail p, namely, a can occur a t  time t2 without ,f3 occurring at 
time t2;  
(iii) condition C doesn't entail ,b' by itself, namely C may hold at  time t3 without P 
occurring at  time t3; 
(iv) C holds a t  time t .  
Nobody has ever spelled out how to decide what conditions affect a given generation 
relation. Such conditions are generally taken to  include the fact that an agent is in standard 
conditions with respect to  a given action - for example, an agent whose feet are tied won't 
be able to  go into the other room; and relevant conditions about the state of the world, for 
example that, in order for flipping the switch t o  generate turning the light on, all electrical 
equipment must be working. I just want to point out that characteristics of the actions 
taking part in a given generation relation should not be part of such conditions. It could 
be in fact argued that some of these characteristics, e.g. along(diagona1) for cutting the 
square, should be part of conditions on the generation relation. However, i t  would then 
be impossible to choose in a principled way which features of an action belong to the 
description of the action, and which belong to the conditions on generation. Moreover, 
there are cases in which such features are implicit arguments of verbs. Turn has an intrinsic 
argument, direction: therefore, counterclockwise has to be a specification of turn screw, 
not a condition on the generation relation between turn screw and loosen screw. 
Another observation on conditions: the assumptions I mentioned as an object that accom- 
modation has to compute may again be seen as part of conditions on a given generation 
relation. However, they seem to me to be of a different nature. In the Go into the other 
room to get the urn of cofSee example l7 go into the other room may successfully contribute 
to getting the urn of coflee even if there is no urn in the other room - if for example in 
the other room there is a note saying how to get the urn of coffee. The assumption urn 
i n  the other room is simply an expectation that H comes to  have as a consequence of the 
accommodation process. 
Enablement. In ch. 3, I mentioned the following characteristics of enablement: 
1. If a enables ,L?, a brings about a set of conditions that are necessary, but not sufficient, 
for the subsequent execution of ,f?. 
2. As a consequence, enablement embodies a notion of temporal precedence: if a enables 
p, a has to temporally precede ,L?, namely, a has to begin, but not necessarily end, 
before P: in the following example, hold has to continue for the whole duration of fill. 
Ex. 50 Hold the cup under the spigot to fill it with cofSee. 
3. In the same way that the generatee affects the execution of the generator, so the 
enabled action affects the execution of the enabling action. to in go to the mirror 
is interpreted differently, depending upon whether the action to  be enabled is seeing 
oneself or carrying the mirror somewhere else. 
To my knowledge, the only definition of enablement existing in the literature is Balkanski's 
definition of conditional enablement. Balkanski's definition reflects her observation that 
[1990, 11.261 
A closer look at the enabling relation shows that the set of conditions brought 
about by the occurrence of the enabling activity is necessary either to satisfy an  
executability constraint o n  the enabled activity or provide the ... condition on a 
generation relation in  which the enabled activity participates. 
Balkanski exemplifies the former type of enablement with buying ingredients enables prepar- 
ing the dish, and the latter with inserting the dowels enables attaching the rails. Notice in 
fact that inserting dowels brings about some conditions under which a third action, such 
as hammering, generates attaching the rails. The formal definition is as follows: 
I 7 ~ h i s  i an indirect generation relation; however, I think the point I am making holds for direct generation as 
well. 
Definition 6 CENABLES(a, P, C1) 3 C2 
(i) CGEN(a, ACHIEVE(C2), C1) A 
CEXEC(P, C2) V 37 CGEN(y, P, Cz)]] 
a is defined as enabling /3 if 
1. a generates achieving C2, and 
2. (i) either C2 has to hold for ,L? to be executable - CEXEC(P, C2). This is the case 
for a = buying ingredients and /3 = preparing dish; 
(ii) or there is a third action y that generates /3 under C2. This is the case for a = 
inserting dowels, P = attach mils, y = hammer rails. 
The notion of temporal precedence between a and /3 that enablement embodies is missing 
in Def. 6, and is contained in a second definition - ENABLES - that builds on CENABLES 
and that relates two activities. In fact, both Pollack and Balkanski assume two different 
types for actions. The first is act-types, which don't have an associated performance time, 
the second activities, defined as act-types plus an agent and a time interval. I have doubts 
on the previous definitions of enablement and generation because I am not convinced that 
distinguishing between act-types and activities is correct: for example, I don't agree with 
giving more prominence to the agent role over the other arguments of the verb, as the 
definition of activity seems to advocate. 
However, as in the case of generation, I will start from this definition of enablement and I 
will modify it as the need arises. 
As I also mentioned in Ch. 3, the distinction between generation and enablement be- 
comes blurred when we extend the concept of generation to a sequence of actions A 
< a1, a 2 ,  ..., an > that generate another action P. Is the relation between a; E A and 
,O generation or enablement? Consider for example the move-action in fig. 5.3: what is the 
relation between the header - interpreted as get the urn of coffee - and the actions which 
are part of its body, for example GO,,, namely, go into the other room? The answer seems 
to stem from intuitions: if one sees the two actions as separate, one could say that go into 
the other mom enables get the urn of coffee; otherwise, that go into the other room is part 
of get the urn of coflee. The question seems even more difficult to answer if, instead of 
considering a1 and P ,  one takes a; with i > 1: it seems very hard to say that a; enables 
P. 
I think that the only sensible way of answering such question is to do it with respect to the 
formal representation: I will keep the term generation for a relation defined between two 
actions, or between a sequence A < al,a2, ..., an > and an action p. In the latter case, 
the relation between a; and ,O will be termed indirect genemtion - it will be called substep 
in the plan graph. Enablement will instead hold of pairs of actions a; and a k ,  possibly 
belonging to a sequence A generating 0. 
Accommodation: Making an Assumption 
In this section, I will show how the process of understanding Ex. 2 - Go into the other room to 
get the urn of coffee, which requires the assumption that the urn is in the other room, is carried 
out. 
The process begins with the following representation Is: 
Here the FOR-function (derived from the to-phrase) encodes the CONTRIBUTES relation hold- 
ing between the go-action cr and the get-action @. 
Given the presence of the to phrase, we know that the go-action a may generate or enable the 
get-action p. Given that no direct generation or enablement relation between the two is found, 
the hypothesis that a may be part of a sequence of actions that generate /3 is put forward. This 
hypothesis is pursued first of all by looking up the get-action in the action library: /3 matches 
the header of the general move-action shown in Figure 5.3 if the object j to  be moved is bound 
to  the urn of cofSee 19: 
The next step is to try to match the go-action with some subaction y of the get-action: 
the go-action can be understood to  be the first action yl in the get-action by taking [AT(j)] 
and [IN([oTHER-ROOM])] to be the same place. This is equivalent to making the following 
assumption: 
Assumption (5.10) could of course be wrong, say if there were a note in the next room saying 
ha ha, it's not really in this mom but the next. 
5.2.4 Integrating Hybrid Systems and Conceptual Structures 
So far, I have shown that two different representation schema are useful t o  perforni different 
kinds of inferences. Moreover, each responds to  some of the desiderata I listed earlier: in 
particular, a hybrid system provides the flexibility required in dealing with action descriptions 
that don't exactly match the stored knowledge; a semantic representation such as Jackendoff's 
is linguistically motivated and manages to  capture generalizations, such as that carry is a move- 
action augmented with a specific physical means of moving the object. 
Given that the two formalisms both show promise, the next natural step is to  integrate the 
two. Both will benefit from this integration. 
"This representation is constructed by a Combinatory Categorial Grammar parser - see [White, 19911 and 
sect. 5.5. 
lgNotice that  the description the urn of coffee actually refers to a discourse referent: I assume there is some 
process responsible for the discourse model, as in fact happens in the AnimNL system - see sect. 5.5. 
Defining terms in the T-Box by means of linguistically sound primitives will transform the 
T-Box into a real lexicon. 
On the other hand, a KL-ONE style representation will make it possible to use Conceptual 
Structures in a computational framework, by endowing it with a hierarchical organization and 
with the possibility of extending the lexicon. A flavor of hierarchical organization is present in 
[Jackendoff, 19901 itself. Consider (5.2), repeated here for convenience: 
ROOM and KITCHEN are atoms in Conceptual Structures, and so are many other entities, such 
as LIQUID and W I N E .  It could be argued that this is too high a level of atomicity: Jackendoff 
postulates a type Thing which is a collection of atoms, including, for example, LIQUID and WINE. 
Although he mentions that there are rules to determine that W I N E  satisfies the feature L I Q U I D ,  
he never goes into the algorithm for performing such computation. This can of course be done 
by means of a taxonomy rooted in the concept thing. Liquid will be defined as a subconcept of 
thing, and wine as a subconcept of liquid, e.g. by adding to  liquid the restriction made from 
grapes. 
By having such a taxonomy, we can also define a concept animate, and use i t  to  indicate 
that the structural position corresponding to  agent is not thing but animate, as many theories 
of action require. 
Jackendoff defines all these concepts as atoms because they cannot be defined at the level 
of Conceptual Structures: this is readily captured in KL-ONE by defining them as primitive 
concepts, namely, concepts for which necessary but not sufficient conditions can be stipulated - 
apart maybe from wine, as made from grapes can be considered as a defining condition. 
A hierarchical organization is also very helpful to deal with actions that differ in M A N N E R ,  
such as move and carry, which adds to  move the specification [M-,r HANDS])], 
or go,, and walk. 
In fig. 5.4, I present part of a T-Box that includes the move-action shown in Fig. 5.3. There 
are four taxonomies, rooted respectively in thing, place, path, event 20. 
Thing. The taxonomy rooted in thing is very straightforward; here only the subconcepts ani- 
mate and inanimate are shown. 
Place. The concepts belonging to  this hierarchy correspond to  conceptual functions of the form 
F: Thing -, Place. Some such functions are AT, IN, ON. In Fig. 5.4, I show only the 
concept at-place, corresponding to  the AT conceptual function. at-place has a single role 
at with exactly one filler, of type Thing. 
Path. The concepts belonging to this hierarchy represent functions yielding Paths. The from- 
to-path concept has two roles, from and to, each of which has a filler place. from-to-path 
corresponds to  the complex Conceptual Structure: 
20 Jackendoff also defines state, manner, property. The respective hierarchies are not shown in fig. 5.4. 

The concept from(at)-to-path restricts the role to inherited from from-to-path to  be filled 
by at-place. It therefore corresponds to  
Event. Subtypes of event are cause and caused. 
cause has two roles, the agent, restricted to  be animate, and the caused event. 
The hierarchy rooted in caused will include all possible events that can be arguments to 
the conceptual function CAUSE. Here I have shown part of the subhierarchy rooted in 
go, which corresponds to the following conceptual function: GO: Thing x Path + Event. 
The concept go has two roles: goer, which has thing as filler, and path, that has a path as 
filler. 
Subconcepts of go are gosp and goct,[. The concept gosp-from(at)-to restricts the role path 
of go to  be a from(at)-to-path. 
Finally, the concept move-j-to-1 is defined as a subconcept of cause by imposing the restric- 
tion that the filler of caused be gosp-from(&)-to. A final restriction is needed, indicated 
by the role value map: the filler for the role found at  the end of one of the branches has 
to be the same found at  the end of the other branch 21. 
Notice that this definition of move-j-to-b exactly captures its Conceptual Structure defini- 
tion, as shown in the header in Fig. 5.3, and repeated here for convenience: 
I hope I have convinced the reader that mapping Conceptual Structures into KL-ONE like 
primitives is rather straightforward, although the final result may not correspond to  the intu- 
itions we have regarding those concepts - on the other hand, a Conceptual Structure represen- 
tation of a verb is not very intuitive either! 
The important question now is: with a classical predicate argument representation, such as 
move(i, j, TO(l)), it is very easy to  classify new concepts. However, now the representation is 
in a sense "multi-level": for example, 1, the place where to move j, is found navigating from 
the concept move-j-to-1 through the role chain caused, path, at .  I have to verify whether the 
classifier is able to properly classify these "multi-level" concepts. 
5.3 The plan graph 
Finally, I want to discuss the third component of my model of instruction understanding, the 
plan graph and the inferences that build it. 
"In the CLASSIC system that  I have been using, role value maps can be expressed by means of SAME-AS, in 
this case SAME-AS (caused goer) (caused path at). It should be read as the filler of the role "goer" of "caused" 
is the SAME-AS the filler of the role "at" of "path" of "causedJJ. 
The plan graph represents the structure of the intentions that the agent adopts as a response 
to  the instructions. It keeps track of the goals the agent is pursuing, of the hierarchical relations 
between the goals and the actions the agent is going to execute to achieve such goals, and of 
various relations between actions. It also helps in interpreting the instructions that follow. In 
the following example, establishing the initial goal get the urn of coflee provides the context in 
which the other instructions have to be interpreted: 
Ex. 51 a )  Go into the other room to get the urn of coffee. 
b) Before you pick it up, be sure that it's unplugged. 
c )  When  you bring it back here, carry it with both hands. 
A similar strategy is adopted for example by Kautz [1990]: however, he only uses two relations 
between events, is-a and part-of, while my representation is richer. In Figure 5.5, the plan graph 
built after interpreting the three instructions belonging to Ex. 51 is shown: in sect. 5.2.3, I have 
discussed how the leftmost branch of the tree is built. The algorithms that build the other two 
branches still need to be designed in detail. 
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5.3.1 The data structure 
The plan graph is composed of nodes that contain descriptions of individual actions, and arcs 
that denote relations between these actions. 
A node contains the Conceptual Structure representation of an action - not the whole entry 
in the action library, only the header - augmented with the consequent state achieved after the 
execution of that action; the consequent state is computed from the effects of the action, and is 
needed for the interpretation of the instructions that follow. Notice that in Figure 5.5 the labels 
on the nodes are only mnemonics, and do not represent their real contents. 
The arcs represent various relations between actions. If a and P are linked by R, with a the 
origin of R, R can be: 
1. Temporal, such as precedes in Fig. 5.5. Another temporal relation of interest is during, 
that indicates simultaneity. Also, in future extensions to the plan graph in which states 
are represented, an arc time will be used to Link an action and a state: its meaning is that 
the action has to start when a given state comes to  hold - this would model instructions 
such as turn the gas 08 when the tofu has turned golden. 
2. Generation and substep. Substep means that a belongs to  a sequence that generates P.  If 
the sequence is composed by a single action, substep reduces to  generation. 
3. Enablement . 
4. And, or. These arcs may be needed to  represent actions belonging to  a certain set: and 
will link two actions that both have to  be performed, but that are totally unrelated to  one 
another, such as Prepare a dessert and do laundry 22; two actions are linked by an or arc 
if they are in alternative, such as vacuum or dust-mop the parquet, from Ex. 23. 
There are assumptions associated with the plan graph. Some of those are derived from the 
accommodation process; in this case, an assumption is associated to a relation between two 
actions, and therefore, to  the corresponding arc in the plan graph-for example A1 in Fig. 5.5. 
Other assumptions are derived from the qualifiers associated with actions, and are associated 
with the nodes describing those actions-A2 in Fig. 5.5. 
5.3.2 T11e algorithm 
There are various inference processes that manipulate the plan graph, and that can be character- 
ized as either planning-e.g. plan expansion, subgoding-and plan recognition-inferring the 
more abstract goal some actions are supposed to achieve, performing accommodation inferences. 
Some of these inferences can be made independently of the situation the agent finds him/herself 
in, others instead require grounding the instructions in the current situation. For example, upon 
observing that the door to the other room is closed, the agent will infer s/he needs to  perform 
open the door. As I already said, the only inferences I am interested in are performed prior to 
grounding the plan in the current situation. Given that the plan graph is used by the AnimNL 
22The fact that they are unrelated may hold only a t  the understanding level; when execution time comes, the 
agent will possibly have to make choices, for example which action to execute first, or even which subactions to 
interleave. 
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1) Add to A-Box individual(s) corresponding to Conceptual Structure 
representation of action(s) described in input instructions. 
Set flag ACCOM if they don't exactly match known concepts. 
2) IF new utterance is simple imperative 
THEN simple-imperative-procedure; 
IF new utterance is Do-a-to-do-@ 
THEN Do-a-to-do-P procedure; 
IF new utterance is DONT-imperative 
THEN DONT-procedure; 
IF new utterance is neg-TC-imperative 
THEN negTC-procedure; 
IF new utterance contains temporal subordinate 
THEN TEMP-procedure; 
IF new utterance is . . .  
THEN . . . . 
Figure 5.6: The top-level algorithm 
system, other modules expand the plan graph derived from the input instructions according to  
the current situation - see sect. 5.5. 
The plan graph is built by an interpretation algorithm that works by keeping track of active 
nodes - which will include the goal currently in focus, the nodes just added to  the tree, and 
possibly other nodes. 
The topmost level of the algorithm is very simple, as shown in Fig. 5.6. Given the conceptual 
structure of the current instruction, it will create the corresponding individuals in the A-Box, 
setting a flag ACCOM if they don't exactly match known concepts; then it will call the procedure 
corresponding to  the syntactic structure of the input instruction. 
Needless to say, the algorithm is far from being fully developed: this is where my individual 
efforts and others' in the project come together. I consider myself responsible for the algorithms 
pertaining to  purpose clauses and to  negative imperatives. Clearly many other problems have 
to  be addressed, for example temporal inferences, or plan recognition inferences of the kind that 
Kautz has proposed and that I described in sect. 2. 
In the following, I present the algorithm for purpose clauses, and some ideas regarding the 
one for negative imperatives. My working assumption is that the various procedures receive 
in input a list of active nodes, so that they know in which subtree to insert the new structure 
derived from the current input instruction. 
The algorithm for "Do a to do P" 
Input: the individuals in A-box corresponding to Conceptual Structure representations of cw and 
@, ACCOM, the current plan graph, and the list of active nodes. 
1. Retrieve from the action library the simple plan(s) associated to ,L3 - definition(s) of which 
p is the header, generation relations in which P is the generatee, enablement relations in 
which ,D is the enablee. 
2. If ACCOM is not set 
(a) If there is a direct generation or enablement relation between a and P, augment plan 
graph with the structure derived from it, after calling the procedure for computing 
possible assumptions (compute-assumptions). 
(b) If there is no such direct relation, recursively look for an indirect relation between 
the two actions, namely, look for possible connections between a and the substeps in 
the definitions for P - as I showed in sect. 5.2.3 for go into the other room and get the 
urn of coffee. This step may require calling the procedure for computing assumptions 
(compute-assumptions). Augment plan graph. 
3. If ACCOM is set, 
(a) if there is GEN(w, P, agent, t )  or ENABLES(w, P, agent, t), check whether 
i. w is an ancestor of a :  take a as the intended action; 
ii. w is a descendant of a :  take w as the intended action. 
iii. w and a are unifiable: take the unified description w U a as the intended action. 
iv. if w and a are not unifiable because of disjoint role fillers, signal failure. 
(b) If there is no direct generation or enablement relation between a and P, proceed as 
in step 2b. Given that a is not known to  the system, use heuristics similar t o  the 
ones employed in 3a in order to find the relations between a and the substeps of P. 
A point I haven't addressed in the algorithm is what to do when step 1 yields more than one 
simple plan. In this case, the intended plan is the one which includes an action that matches 
a. For example, there could be more than one plan indexed by get the urn of coffee; go into the 
other room will help select those that include a physical movement on the part of the agent. If 
after this selection step there still is more than one available plan, different hypotheses can be 
pursued in parallel, or some measure of best "match" can be devised. 
5.4 The algorithm for negative imperatives 
So far, I have devoted far more attention to purpose clauses than to negative imperatives; 
therefore, I will simply make some comments on the inferences needed for negative imperatives, 
and on how the representation of the plan graph is affected by negative imperatives. 
In the plan graph as defined so far, there is no provision for representing that an action should 
NOT be performed. Remember also the difference between DONT and neg-TC imperatives: in 
the former case the action a to be avoided is "independent", in the latter a is a side-effect or 
an undesirable way of performing another action P. The very first thing that comes to mind is 
to  introduce two new arcs, AVOID, and AVOID-IN. In Figs. 5.7 and 5.8, these arcs are used to 
capture the difference between Exs. 45.a and .b, repeated here for convenience: 
Ex. 52 a. Use a vinyl-to-vinyl paste for any type of border you plan to  hang over wallpaper. To 
paste the border for hanging, cover the entire back with paste and book the strip; don't crease 
the folds. 
b. To  book the strip, fold the bottom third or more of the strip over the middle of the panel, 
pasted sides together, taking care not to crease the wallpaper sharply at the fold. 
As far as ATJOID is concerned, though, its meaning seems to amount to more than simply 
avoid the action at the end of the arc. In Ex. 52.a, what has to be avoided is performing crease 
on the result of book. If crease were executed, it would follow book: the AVOID arc has a 
temporal flavor to it. In the case of Ex. 23, relative to cleaning the parquet, the actions to be 
avoided, e.g. scrub, are alternative ways to generate the goal clean the parquet: the AVOID 
arc in this case should capture that scrub would generate clean parquet, if it were executed. As 
a first working hypothesis, I will then assume that the arcs gen, temporal relations, substep, 
enables have a corresponding AVOID arc - given that these is a very tentative solution, I am 
representing the AVOID arcs as dashed lines. 
In ch. 4, I also mentioned, with respect to Ex. 23, that an algorithm similar to Kautz's could 
be used in this case, after adapting it to a representation based on GEN - in which we have for 
example 
GEN(vacuum(agent , floor), clean(agent , floor), agent, t ), 
GEN(scrub(agent, floor), clean(agent, floor), agent, t )  
A possible plan graph for a simplified version of Ex. 23 is shown in fig. 5.9. 
5.5 Application: Animation from Instructions 
The application system in which my work is grounded is the Animation from Natural Language 
(AnimNL) project at  the University of Pennsylvania. 
Over the years, Penn7s Graphics Laboratory has developed an extensive model-based ani- 
mation system. The system embodies anthropometric, kinematic and dynamic models, so that 
agents of different builds and strengths can be animated to perform tasks such as grasp, look at, 
stand up, sit down etc. 
Given such model-based animation, it makes sense to envision a system where agents are 
given goals to achieve, or instructions to  perform. Such a system could be used, among other 
things, to instruct human agents on how to perform a task; as an aid to designers, e.g. to 
check that the product is designed correctly for maintenance and repair; as an aid to  instruction 
manuals writers, e.g. to ensure that their instructions are understandable. 
Given the wide variety of possible users and applications for such a system, the most suitable 
and flexible language for interacting with the animated agent is Natural Language, as it is the 
only communication source accessible to  users other than programming-wise animators [Badler 
et al., 1990; Levison, 1991; Webber et al., 19911. 
Fig. 5.10 represents the architecture of the system. Referring to the figure, the part of dia- 
gram above the action gate represents the understanding and reasoning process an agent engages 
in prior to any commitment to action, and has as a result, a generation of such commitment. 
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Instructions are given to AnimNL in steps consisting of one or more utterances. A step 
specifies a continuous behavior the agent must attend to - Ex. 51 is one such step. Steps are 
processed by a parser that uses a Combinatory Categorid Grammar [White, 19911, and produces 
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developed into the plan graph, by means of processes of plan inference, planning and plan 
grounding. The inferences I discussed in this proposal mainly belong to  the plan inference box. 
Clearly, the nodes in the plan graph as shown in fig. 5.5 are not sufficiently specified to drive 
a simulator. First of all the plan needs to  be ground into the particulars of the perceptually 
knowable environment: further planning will enable nodes of the plan graph to  become more 
and more detailed. 
When an intention becomes sufficiently specified for the agent to be ready to  commit to  it, 
the intention is gated, triggering another, low-level planning process - the part below the "action 
gate" in fig. 5.10. This low-level planning process takes care of postural planning, namely, of 
planning how the agent can bring himself in a position in which he can perform the requested 
action. Work being done by Jung [I9911 is aimed at planning the postures needed in the course of 
satisfying an action. Finally, animation directives are sent t o  YAPS, the simulator - in fig. 5.10, 
Jack is the graphics system supporting animation. 
5.6 Proposed work 
Finally, I would like to summarize the work I am proposing to do on the model of instruction 
understanding. 
a Theoretic part. 
- The speaker / hearer's model: extend and verify the axioms I wrote, and define 
various predicates such as CONSTRAINED, CONTRIBUTES, AVOID. 
- Give proper and accurate definitions for generation and enablement. 
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Figure 5.10: The architecture of the AnimNL system 
- Develop adequate inferences for negation. 
- Study how applicable the accommodation inferences are. Do the two types I devel- 
oped with regard to  purpose clauses - computing a more specific description of an 
action, and computing assumptions on the basis of which a given relation between 
two actions goes through - need to be integrated? may it happen that a whole 
structure composed of a goal and other actions needs to  be integrated in the plan 
graph? do these inferences have broader application, for example to  cases in which 
the goals are not explicitly given? How do the inferences necessary for negation relate 
to the ones developed for purpose clauses? 
a Implement at ion. 
- Integrate hybrid systems and Conceptual Structures - I have been using the CLASSIC 
system [Brachman et al., 19901 so far. The main question that needs to  be addressed is 
whether the classification algorithm implemented in CLASSIC can deal with "multi- 
level" concept definitions. 
- Develop and implement a more precise algorithm to deal with purpose clauses and 
in particular with negative imperatives. An issue that needs to be dealt with is the 
updating of the list of active nodes in the plan graph. Another is the representation 
of actions that should not be executed in the plan graph: rather than having a single 
AVOID arc, the solution may be having different arcs, corresponding to  the relation 
- e.g. generation, enablement etc - that the action a to be avoided would bear to 
another action in its context, if a were executed. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this proposal is to put forward the following claim: 
most instructions don't exactly mirror the agent's knowledge, but are understood by accommodat- 
ing them in the context of the general plan the agent is considering; the agent's accommodation 
process is guided by the goal(s) that s/he is trying to achieve. The concept of goal itself is perva- 
sive in NL instructions, and a NL system which interprets instructions must be able to recognize 
and/or hypothesize goals, keep tmck of them, and use them in computing the description of the 
action to be performed. 
I hope I managed to convince the reader that such claim is justified. The evidence I provided 
rests on the analysis of naturally occurring instructions, and in particular of positive imperatives 
containing purpose clauses, and of negative imperatives. 
The analysis of purpose clauses has allowed me to show that goals do direct inference pro- 
cesses. I defined two inference processes pertaining to accommodation: computing a more 
specific action description and computing the expectations H builds upon hearing or reading a 
certain instruction. 
The analysis of purpose clauses also has important consequences for the characteristics that 
an action representation formalism should have: computing more specific action descriptions 
requires that the formalism be flexible enough to  recognize different levels of specificity; the 
relations between actions that purpose clauses embody are generation and enablenient, that 
must therefore be included in the representation formalism. 
The analysis of negative imperatives has shown that there are two classes of negative im- 
peratives, DONT and neg-TC imperatives, that perform different pragmatic functions. They 
differ in the expectations that S has on the intentions H will adopt, and in the relation existing 
between the negated action and other actions in the context. 
On the basis of the analysis of these data, I define a computational model of instructions 
consisting of three components, an axiomatic formalization of the communicative act taking 
place between S and H, an action representation formalism, and inference processes that build 
the structure of H's intentions. 
More in detail, 
1. The speaker / hearer model of imperatives is based on Cohen and Levesque's model, 
which accounts for the intentions H adopts in response to  S's utterance. I extended it  by 
providing axioms that model purpose clauses, DONT and neg-TC imperatives. 
2. The action representation formalism integrates hybrid knowledge representation systems 
and Conceptual Structures. I showed that the former are useful to  compute one kind of 
accommodation, and the latter facilitates computing the other kind of accommodation. I 
showed that a T-Box can be easily expressed in Conceptual Structure terms. 
3. I discussed the data structure adopted for the plan-graph, and sketched an algorithm that 
builds it. 
A lot of work remains to  be done, including: 
For the theoretic part, 
- Extend and verify the axioms I wrote to extend the speaker / hearer's model, and 
define various predicates such as CONSTRAINED, CONTRIBUTES, AVOID. 
- Give proper and accurate definitions for generation and enablement. 
- Develop adequate inferences for negation. 
- Study how applicable the accommodation inferences are. Do the two types I devel- 
oped with regard t o  purpose clauses - computing a more specific description of an 
action, and computing assumptions on the basis of which a given relation between 
two actions goes through - need to  be integrated? may it happen that a whole 
structure composed of a goal and other actions needs to  be integrated in the plan 
graph? do these inferences have broader application, for example to  cases in which 
the goals are not explicitly given? How do the inferences necessary for negation relate 
to the ones developed for purpose clauses? 
For the implement ation, 
- Integrate hybrid systems and Conceptual Structures - I  have been using the CLASSIC 
system [Brachman et al., 19901 so far. The main question that needs to be addressed is 
whether the classification algorithm implemented in CLASSIC can deal with "multi- 
level" concept definitions. 
- Develop and implement a more precise algorithm to deal with purpose clauses and 
in particular with negative imperatives. An issue that needs to be dealt with is the 
updating of the list of active nodes in the plan graph. Another is the representation 
of actions that should not be executed in the plan graph: rather than having a single 
AVOID arc, the solution may be having different arcs, corresponding to  the relation 
- e.g. generation, enablement etc - that the action cr to  be avoided would bear to  
another action in its context, if cr were executed. 
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